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Measuring and Managing Catastrophe Risk
Ronald T. Kozlowski* and Stuart B. Mathewson t

Abstract*
We introduce some of the basic principles behind property catastrophe
modeling via simulations. The output of such simulations can be explored
via modernized pin maps and loss likelihood curves. We also briefly discuss
some of the uses of catastrophe modeling in addition to traditional probable
maximum loss estimation. Comments are made on the use of modeling by reinsurers. We hope that this article stimulates discussions on new approaches to
catastrophe modeling.
Key words and phrases: exposure, simulation, reinsurance, pin maps, concentration, market share

*Ronald T. Kozlowski, F.C.A.S., M.A.A.A. is a consulting actuary in the Atlanta office
of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. He holds a B.S. in actuarial science from the University
of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. Mr. Kozlowski helped design TOPCAT, TillinghastTowers Perrin's property catastrophe model and has spoken about the basics of catastrophe modeling. Mr. Kozlowski is also a member of the American Academy of Actuaries Subcommittee on Catastrophe Issues.
Mr. Kozlowski's address is: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, One Atlanta Plaza, 950 East
Paces Ferry Road, Atlanta GA 30326-1119, U.s.A.
tStuart B. Mathewson F.C.A.S., M.A.A.A., c.P.C.U. is a consulting actuary in the
Chicago office of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. He holds a B.S. in fire protection engineering from the IllinoiS Institute of Technology. Mr. Mathewson has spoken extensively
on catastrophic loss modeling. Mr. Mathewson also has made significant contributions
in the development of TOPCAT's hurricane and earthquake models.
Mr. Mathewson's address is: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 200 West Madison Street,
Chicago IL 60606-3414, U.S.A.
*This article is based on the authors' article of the same name that appeared in the
Casualty Actuarial Society May 1995 Discussion Paper Program.
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1

Introduction

Property insurance companies have always been concerned with the
risk of catastrophic loss. They have used mapping as a method to control their exposure since the 1800s when insurance companies were hit
by fires in major cities (Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia). Mapping
first was used to measure conflagration exposure; at that time there
was no coverage for perils other than fire and lightning. Underwriters
would place pins on a map showing the location of their insured buildings, and they would restrict the exposure the company would retain
in a block or town. When wind storm was introduced as a covered
peril in the 1930s, companies used mapping to assure that they were
not overly concentrated for hurricane or tornado perils.
Pin maps were used until the 1960s when companies abandoned this
time-consuming practice. About this time the U.S. was experiencing a
period of low frequency and severity of natural catastrophic events.
Damaging hurricanes were scarce, especially in Florida, and a major
earthquake had not occurred since 1906. Modern fire fighting and construction practices had made the threat of conflagration minimal. As
a result, the insurance industry largely lost the diSCipline of measuring
and managing exposures susceptible to catastrophic loss.
The property catastrophe reinsurance industry had done well in
these fortunate times and subsequently reduced reinsurance rates to
levels below long-term needs. Primary companies were able to purchase
property catastrophe reinsurance at low prices. Property catastrophe
reinsurance purchasing decisions were centered mainly around the desired maximum limit; price considerations were not a significant concern. Many primary companies managed their catastrophe exposures
by purchasing reinsurance using crude rules of thumb and ignored their
concentration of exposure.
Other companies, because of either expense savings or the lack of
capacity in the reinsurance market for large companies, decided to go
without reinsurance. Without reinsurance costs these companies were
able to write business at lower prices and thereby increase their market
share, further exposing themselves to large reductions in their surplus
from catastrophic losses.
In 1989 this naive world changed. Hurricane Hugo swept through
the Caribbean and hit the Atlantic coast of the United States, causing the
largest catastrophe loss in history. The 1989 Lorna Prieta earthquake in
San Francisco reawakened fears of earthquake losses. The reinsurance
market began to react to these and other international events. Catastrophe reinsurance prices started to increase, and coverage was restricted.
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Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida in 1992 on the heels of those
events. Some insurance companies took significant hits to their surplus; others went bankrupt. Many insurance companies had not realized the extent of their exposure concentrations. Reinsurance markets
reacted swiftly by sharply raising prices and retentions while restricting limits. Regulators, rating agencies, and boards of directors became
intensely concerned about their companies' abilities to manage their
catastrophe exposures.
The Northridge, California earthquake and the Great Hanshin earthquake in Kobe, Japan have raised new concerns over the insurability
of a major catastrophe and the success of engineering against earthquakes. Inadequate insurance pricing in catastrophe-prone areas has
contributed to population growth and construction in some of the most
catastrophe-prone areas in the United States.
We will now discuss some of the basics of catastrophe modeling, the
current capabilities, and some current modeling problems, starting with
the most important component of catastrophe modeling: exposure.

2

Exposure Data

All discussions of catastrophic exposure management must begin
with the accuracy and availability of exposure data. The most sophisticated, complex catastrophe modeling systems cannot accurately estimate an insurer's losses if the insurer cannot identify what insurance
coverages have been written and where those risks are physically located.
Company exposure databases vary considerably. The decisions to
retain exposure information may be based on statistical agency, rate
filing, or management information requirements. Budget constraints
also have contributed to the design of some exposure databases. Catastrophe exposure management considerations are almost always of secondary importance.
Statistical plans for property coverages historically have been designed around fire insurance rating. Any shifts toward retaining information necessary for wind and earthquake insurance rating will not occur quickly, as changes to statistical plans have occurred infrequently.
Exposure information can be separated into two categories: physical
characteristics and insurance coverage.
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2.1

Physical Characteristics

Physical characteristics may include:
• Type of risk;
• Location;
• Construction;
• Number of stories;
• Age of risk;
• Number of risks.
The type of risk characteristic can be described in insurance terms
through the line of busines~, classification, and type of policy codes.
The line of business codes can distinguish personal property, commercial property, personal automobile, commercial automobile, personal inland marine, commercial inland marine, businessowner, or farmowner policies. Classification codes can distinguish the type of risks
such as signs, boats, livestock, inventories, etc. The type of policy code
can distinguish different types of commercial policies (mercantile, contracting, motel, office, apartment, etc.).
The quality of available location data varies substantially by company. The location recorded often is the billing location rather than the
location of the property insured. While this may be only a moderate
problem for personal lines, it can cause major distortions when modeling commercial lines. For more complex commercial policies many
of the locations are not identified. This type of coding may produce a
false measure of concentrations at the billing location, while understating other areas.
Some companies cannot provide location detail at zip code or street
address. Location on a county or state detail can be spread to finer
detail using population densities, census data, or credit reports, but
this approach can lead to severe distortions in measuring the concentrations for a speCific insurance company. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is taking steps to force companies to
collect zip code location information. The introduction of nine digit
zip codes further will help to refine exposure location information. In
the future exposure location identification could be determined within
a few feet using satellite technology (global positioning systems).
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Insurance Coverage

Insurance coverage data may include:
• Coverage type;
• Coverage amounts;
• Replacement cost provisions;
• Insurance-to-value provisions;
• Deductibles;
• Co-insurance;
• Reinsurance.
Coverage type distinguishes the type of insured exposure such as buildings, contents, appurtenant structures, vehicles, business interruption,
etc. Replacement cost and insurance-to-value provisions identify those
provisions where the insurance coverage may be greater than the specified coverage amount. Deductibles, co-insurance, and reinsurance provisions can reduce the insured loss to the company.
Insurance coverage datq may vary by peril. For example, commercial
earthquake policies may have sub limits. The hurricane peril may be
excluded in some coastal counties due to wind coverage via windstorm
pools. Companies also often impose higher deductibles for wind and
earthquake perils.

2.3

Data Problems

Experience has shown that some insurance companies, particularly
small to medium sized companies, have difficulty retrieving their data
in a usable fashion. Extracted information may not balance with insurance company reports. Exposure data may be unreliable due to input
errors or heavy reliance on defaults.
The first step to accurately measuring a company's exposures is to
review the data collection and retrieval process to assure that the data
give an accurate picture of insured properties. If the insurance company systems' personnel do not understand underwriting or insurance,
they may not be able to verify the reasonableness of the data provided.
Underwriting and/or actuarial personnel should be involved to assure
the reasonableness of exposure data. Simple data checks on whether
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the zip code is within the specified county or state or whether the implied premium-to-exposure ratios appear reasonable can identify problems with the exposure data.
Once exposure data are deemed to be reasonable, the modeling process can begin. If accurate exposure data are not available, a market
share approach could be used. The market share approach models industry exposures and distributes the losses to company via their market
share. Market share analysis can misrepresent an individual company's
losses significantly.
Companies willing to invest in sophisticated databases to track their
exposures and rate them using appropriate classification systems will
have a competitive edge in coming years.

3 Catastrophe Simulation Modeling
Advances in computer technology have resulted in new quantitative
tools developed to specifically manage catastrophic risk. Geographic
information systems have allowed companies to resurrect pin maps
with significant additional abilities. But beyond looking merely at exposures, catastrophe simulation models have given us the ability to estimate potential losses in a way that reflects current scientific thinking
on frequency and severity distributions.
As actuaries we know that expected catastrophic losses and reinsurance decisions should not be based entirely on past catastrophic losses.
Insured loss data from catastrophes have been recorded for roughly the
last 45 years. During this period, severe hurricanes and earthquakes
were so infrequent that this body of experience is not representative
of the scope of potential occurrences. Also, the distribution of insured
properties has changed dramatically over time due to the population
shift toward the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and the earthquake-prone areas of California.
Clark (1986) and Friedman (1984) provide alternative methods for
determining catastrophe losses through simulation modeling. Their
methods involve first simulating the physical characteristics of a specific catastrophe, then determining damage to exposures, and then calculating potential insured losses from damages.
Although specific catastrophe simulation models are different, they
all operate within a simple framework. The simulation models are
based on three modules: (i) the science module, (ii) the engineering
module, and (iii) the insurance coverage module. The specific functional form of the equations provided for these modules is not impor-
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tant. The important elements are the types of variables the equations
require. These modules are discussed below.

3.1

The Science Module

The science module simulates natural events such as hurricanes,
storm surge, earthquakes, fire following earthquake, tornadoes, hail,
winter storms, etc. The resulting force that causes damage by these
events usually can be described through a series of equations.
For hurricanes, numerous models exist to estimate wind speeds at
risk locations caused by specific storms. A simplistic function of hurricane wind speed at a location is shm,\'ll below.
Wz

=

iw(dp, r, 5, l, a, t)

(1)

where:
Wz
dp
r
5

a
t

Wind speed at location z;
Ambient pressure minus central pressure;
Radius of maximum winds;
Forward speed of the storm;
Landfall location (longitude, latitude);
Angle of incidence at landfall; and
Terrain or roughness coefficient at location z.

Clark (1986) describes one such modeling system and shows how hurricanes can be simulated and used to estimate insurance losses.
For earthquakes, the result of this module is a shaking intensity
at a speCific location (Le., zip code or street address). One possible
relationship is:
(2)
lz = iI(m,5,e,a,g,d)
where:
lz

m
5

e

a
9

d

=

Shaking intensity at location z;
Magnitude of the earthquake;
Fault or seismic area, including location and characteristics;
Epicenter location;
Angle of the fault rupture;
Ground conditions, including poor soil and liquefaction
potential; and
Distance from fault rupture or epicentral area.
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The specific forms of equations (1) and (2) are based upon meteorological and geological hypotheses and are beyond the scope of this
paper as these equations can range from simple equations to more complicated series of differential equations. It is important, however, to
note that the variables used by equations (1) and (2) are meteorological
and geological in nature.

3.2 The Engineering Module
The engineering module is used to determine exposure damage resulting from wind speeds or shaking intensities. Wind and earthquake
engineering research and historical loss information determine these
relationships. We can express these functions as follows:
p(h)

j p(h)( Wz,c,a,s,v,)

pte)

f~e)(Iz, c, a, s, v),

z

z

for hurricane

(3)

for earthquake

(4)

where:
p~h)
p~e)
C

a
S

v

Percent damage from a hurricane at location z;
Percent damage from an earthquake at location z;
Construction of building;
Age of building;
Number of stories; and
Coverage (Le., building, contents, time element).

The variables used by equations (3) and (4) are engineering in nature.
If we apply these damage percentages to the exposed properties
from an insurance company's database, the result will be an estimate
of the total damage to those properties caused by the simulated catastrophe.
(5)
where Dz is the damage at location z and Ez is the dollar exposure at
location z.
Underlying each damage curve or damage function is a frequency
component and a severity component. The frequency component determines the probability that a property will be damaged. The property
is either damaged or not damaged. The severity component determines
the percentage of the property that is damaged, given that damage has
occurred.
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Damages can vary by more than just construction type, number of
stories, age of building, and type of coverage (e.g., regional construction practices, building code and bUilding code enforcement, occupancy
use, surrounding terrain). Friedman (1984) gives an example of damage
relationships that form the basis of the earlier wind models. A study
conducted by the Applied Technology Council (1985) provides much of
the basis for earthquake damage relationships. More research is being
done by the engineering community to refine these relationships. A
cooperative action by insurance companies to share detailed historical
loss data with the engineering community could validate the theoretical
research now being done.
Recent studies have shown that additional exposure information
such as window and door protection, roof covering, and roof sheathing
attachment have the greatest influence on the overall resistance to hurricane damage (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1993). New studies such as these are helping insurance companies
identify those underwriting factors that promote loss mitigation. Just
as fire peril concerns determined early statistical reporting, the "'Tind
and earthquake perils now may encourage finer detailed exposure information for underwriting control and exposure quantification. With
the reporting of such important building characteristics, catastrophe
models will improve their abilities to replicate historical1storm losses.
3.3

The Insurance Coverage Module

The insurance coverage module translates the damaged exposure
into insured damaged exposure. Data required by this module include
limits, replacement cost provisions, and insurance-to-value provisions.
This module also includes loss reduction provisions such as deductibles,
co-insurance, and reinsurance.
The following example describes some of the considerations used
when modeling a primary company's exposures. Different formulae
may be used depending upon whether individual or aggregated exposure data are used or if the modeled company is a primary company or
a reinsurance company.
(ID)z

iID(Dz,r,d,l)

min[max[(r x D z )

- d,

where:
(ID)z

Insured damage at location z;

0], l] + a x Dz

(6)
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Dz
r

d

a

Damage at location z;
Guaranteed replacement cost multiplier;
Deductible;
Reinsurance limit; and
Allocated loss adjusted expense (ALAE) percentage.

The guaranteed replacement cost multiplier adjusts damage to reflect
the cost of replacing an item. Policy conditions determine whether the
insurance limit will have an impact on the replacement cost coverage.
Deductibles need to be modeled as a straight dollar deductible or
percentage deductible. Models must consider the impact of the deductible upon the losses. If the model works on a per risk basis and
simulates the varying severity levels of damage, the impact of the deductible can be determined easily. If the model uses aggregate exposure data, however, it must reflect that not all risks will suffer damage greater than their deductibles. As wind speed or shaking intensity
increases, the average severity damage increases and more of the deductible is utilized.
Reinsurance adjustments should reflect both pro rata and per risk
excess policies written on both a facultative and treaty basis. Reinsurance such as catastrophe reinsurance or other aggregate reinsurance
can be incorporated after damage for an event is aggregated for all
risks. Deductibles and reinsurance coverage may vary on a per building or per occurrence basis.
Unlike the science and engineering modules, the insurance module
is based upon actuarial principles. Careful consideration of the impacts
of deductibles, reinsurance, replacement cost provisions, and other insurance coverages must be made. The impact of these insurance coverages is discussed by other authors and will not be reproduced here.
(See, for example, Head (1971) and Lee (1988).) This insurance module
should include a reflection of allocated loss adjustment costs and loss
of use or business interruption coverage.
3.4

Deterministic VS. Probabilistic Modeling

Models can be based on deterministic or probabilistic approaches.
Deterministic modeling is the simulation of specific events, either historical or hypothetical, that are pertinent to the portfolio under study.
This approach can be helpful for validating model results or for providing a estimate for an certain event that concerns management.
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Probabilistic modeling, however, has the potential to provide much
more information to management. It can provide information for primary or reinsurance pricing and for setting underwriting or marketing
strategies. In probabilistic modeling the modeler runs a large set of
hypothetical events (scenarios) that covers a range of potential events.
The results from these simulations can be used to estimate the probabilities of various levels of loss to the company (Le., loss likelihood).
This approach allows the company to manage its exposure portfolio and
make reinsurance decisions by comparing the potential losses with the
company's appetite for risk.

4

Techniques to Locate and Prevent Concentrations

The modeling process ties the company's exposures with storm or
earthquake frequency/severity information to determine the potential
losses. The output of simulation modeling can provide considerable
information beyond the potential loss levels and their attendant probabilities. An important byproduct of the modeling is information on the
concentration of the company's losses.
With the introduction of computer mapping products, pin maps
have been resurrected. Mapping packages can profile exposure concentrations on a county or zip code basis or, if necessary, show point
locations. Mapping today is limited by the amount of exposure location
information retained by insurance companies. Because most companies now retain zip code detail, the following section will assume this
level of detail.
Summing exposures by zip code can be misleading, as zip codes can
vary significantly in size. Using exposure densities can solve this problem. Exposures are summed by zip code and divided by the number
of square miles within the zip code to yield the exposure density. Exposure density mapping tends to accentuate those inner city zip codes
where more exposure typically is concentrated in a smaller area. Zip
code exposure densities do not identify exposure concentrations within
a zip code.
Analyzing loss potentials by examining only exposure densities can
be misleading. Loss densities should be used. Loss densities are created by simulating a library of storms and retaining the losses on a zip
code level. The losses on a per storm basis are multiplied by the probability of each event. After the losses are aggregated for all storms, the
losses for a zip code are divided by the square miles within the zip code.
The loss density maps combine both the exposure concentrations and
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the frequency and severity of catastrophic events in that zip code. Loss
densities can be used to determine catastrophic loss costs for ratemaking. The following maps show an example of the exposure density and
loss density maps (Figures 1 and 2 respectively) for the northeast region
for a sample insurance company.
Another graphical representation of a company's exposures is a histogram. Histograms can show the relative loss by landfall area for a
specific type of storm or return period storm. These storms could be
a specific class hurricane or they could be the 95th percentile storms
for each area. Figures 3 and 4 are histograms showing the hypothetical
results for the industry (Figure 3) and for sample insurance company
(Figure 4). As can be seen from these histograms, our sample insurance company has significantly greater exposure to a hurricane hitting
central Florida than the industry does. The results of modeling can be
used to decide the most appropriate actions to address problem areas.
The most likely areas of action are marketing, underwriting, pricing,
and reinsurance.
For many companies, the focus of marketing is their agency force.
They can select, within limits, where to appoint their agents, how much
business they will accept from each agent, and where that business is
located. The results of probabilistic modeling can help a company considerably in this area. From those results management can determine
which agents are producing business with a disproportional potential
for catastrophic losses and work with those agents to reduce writings
to acceptable levels while minimizing the effect on the agent. The company can identify areas where new agents can more safely be appointed,
so that additional writings will not exacerbate the exposure problem.
Similarly, underwriting standards can be established that discourage
business in areas of dangerous concentration, while encouraging busi~
ness elsewhere.
Modeling can be used for many purposes:
• To monitor the catastrophe potential in all areas of the country;
• To warn of growing levels of concentration before they become a
problem.
• To test the effects of various underwriting actions such as increased deductibles, policy sublimits, and selective policy nonrenewals; and
• To identify those areas for more stringent individual risk protection requirements.
Pin maps are back!

Figure 1
Northeast Region Exposure Density
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Northeast Region Loss Density
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Reinsurance and Excess Modeling

There was a dramatic drop in catastrophe reinsurance availability
following Hurricane Andrew. This drop was caused by fears among the
reinsurers that they had become overextended in catastrophe business
and that they needed to better control their aggregate exposures. The
demise of the London Market Excess (LMX) market contributed to a
reduction in retrocessional capacity available to reinsurers who wrote
larger lines than were prudent. Reinsurance markets cut the capacity.
Modeling allows a reinsurer to measure potential exposures, so that
it can more efficiently write business while safeguarding its assets.
Models allow it to measure the maximum losses possible to certain
events, so that it isn't restricted to a certain amount of aggregate limit in
an arbitrary geographic zone. By tying the models to the underwriting
process, the reinsurer can determine the effect on its concentrations
from adding a contract. This ability to better measure potential losses
increases the underwriter's willingness to accept additional contracts,
thus increasing the availability of reinsurance in the market.

5.1

Does Market Share Analysis Work?

Unfortunately, modeling for reinsurers is not as easy as it is for
primary companies. This is due to the differences in available data and
the additional complexity of contract conditions.
Most primary companies have detailed exposure data, at least by
zip code, allowing the modeler to estimate losses at that level. Until recently, however, reinsurers have been limited to premium data by state.
This lack of detailed data necessitated a modeling approach wherein
losses first were simulated for the entire insurance industry, then the individual ceding company losses were estimated using its market share.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the market share loss estimate
and the actual loss for individual companies. There is little correlation
between the two for individual companies.
Market share analysis for earthquake is even more difficult because
current line of business structures do not define whether earthquake
coverage is provided. For example, personal earthquake coverage can
be reported under homeowners or personal earthquake policies.
In late 1993 exposure data by county were requested by many of the
more technical reinsurance markets. This data enhanced reinsurers'
abilities to estimate primary companies' losses, but not to the level of
accuracy n~eded to price reinsurance.
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Figure 5
Statewide Market Share
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Market share analysis is even less accurate when modeling excess
property or large account business. A market share approach for an
excess writer treats that business as ground-up business (Le., losses
without reflection of deductibles), totally distorting the potential to the
company. Similarly, large account businesses rarely carry accurate location codes on all the buildings in a schedule. Even if county exposure
information is available, it is possible that the location data refer to
the billing location rather than to the risk location. This type of coding usually puts large concentrations of exposure in a small number of
locations, ignoring the real spread of risk.
While market share analysis is a significant step forward in analyzing reinsurers' loss potential, we believe that market share modeling
based on county data leaves much to be desired. For instance, the differences in damages for those zip codes along the coast versus those
inland can be substantial, yet market share modeling does not differentiate them.
Market share modeling can be particularly misleading for a company
with a distribution of risks within a county that is different from the
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industry distribution. Until either actual zip code exposures of the detailed results or the company's own modeling are readily available to the
reinsurance market, the information used by all but the most sophisticated reinsurance markets will continue to be inadequate to properly
underwrite their book of business. The most sophisticated reinsurance
markets are using zip code information to underwrite their book of
business.
One way to best utilize primary company modeling is for a reinsurer or the market as a whole to define a set of standard scenarios,
either probabilistic or deterministic, to be modeled against the primary
company exposures. The reinsurer can calculate contract losses based
on contract terms to determine its portfolio losses from each scenario.
This information provides a quantitative comparison of various contracts as well as the effect of any new contract to the portfolio for underwriting and priCing decisions. Adjustments may be necessary to
compensate for differences among the various models used by the ceding companies.

5.2

How to Model Reinsurance Losses

While primary company loss modeling usually can be done on a
policy or aggregate basis, reinsurance modeling should be done on a
contract by contract basis. Combining contracts with different policy
limits, quota share percentages, and attachment points can distort the
modeling results.
Losses should be calculated using the total values exposed and then
limited based upon the conditions of the reinsurance contracts. Policy
limits apply to each individual risk location, whereas loss limits apply
to all locations. The combinations of different contracts reduce the
ability to model losses appropriately.
Mapping reinsured exposures is more difficult than primary companyanalysis. For example, assume three risks are covered under a $10
million excess $ 5 million reinsurance contract; see Table 1. Mapping
the exposure to this policy could be done a number of ways. First,
we could map the full exposure for each risk. The problem with this
method is that it can overstate the importance of Risk B. Second, we
could map the exposure inside the excess of loss on a per risk basis
($10 million for Risk B, $7 million for Risk C). But this method ignores
Risk A.
One answer to catastrophe exposure mapping is to run the probabilistiC database against all exposures. One event could cause losses to
both Risk A and Risk B so that each reSUlting loss within the excess of
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Table 1
Excess Reinsurance Contract Data
Losses
City
Risk A $ 3 million Palm Beach
Risk B $40 million
Miami
Risk C $12 million
Atlanta

loss agreement would be spread proportionately to each risk. Unlike
the first suggestion, the exposure from Risk B would not be overemphasized. Unlike the second mapping suggestion, the exposure from
Risk A can contribute toward losses.
Models that use only mean damage factors can distort loss potential,
especially when an excess contract is being modeled. It is possible that
using mean damage factors will result in an estimate of no losses to an
excess contract, when losses are possible. For example, assume that
a specific wind speed causes an average of 15 percent damage to a
specific type of building. Within each estimate of damage, no matter
how defined (frame construction, shingled hip roof), there always exists
a range of damage potential. Risks having an average of 15 percent
damage may consist of some risks having 5 percent damage and some
having 75 percent damage. It is possible that the one risk having 75
percent damage may hit the reinsurance layer. In modeling reinsurance
layers it is important to build in the variation in loss severity. The
variation in damage severity can be built into the engineering module.

5.3

Payback

One of the pricing concepts in the catastrophe reinsurance market is
that of payback or return time. When an underwriter considers the price
he or she will charge for a treaty, the underwriter determines an approximate frequency of an event that will affect the layer in question. Thus,
if the actuary is pricing a layer $25,000,000 excess of $25,000,000, he
or she needs an idea of how often to expect an occurrence that "'rill
cause a loss to the ceding company of more than $25,000,000. If the
actuary believes that such an event will happen every five years and
that every such event will exceed $50,000,000, the actuary can estimate the amount necessary to charge for the loss portion of the price.
Simply put, a $25,000,000 limit with a five year payback should cost
$5,000,000, plus provisions for expenses, risk load, and profit. In
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reality, this exercise is not as simple, but one can determine the expected cost in the $25,000,000 excess of $25,000,000 layer using a loss
likelihood l curve produced from the probabilistic storm database.
Catastrophe modeling can help the underwriter estimate these return times or paybacks. By modeling the ceding company's exposures,
the reinsurer can simulate the effects of various events on the proposed
layers to be offered. The probabilities of loss levels that will hit each
layer can be calculated; the underwriter can convey the probabilities
(e.g., 5 percent) to return times (e.g., 20 years).
5.4

Additional Contract PriCing

The term additional contract pricing refers to determining the pricing and acceptability of a contract based upon the marginal profit and
marginal risk that the contract adds to the portfolio. The adjustment
for risk is based on how much the ne,,,' contract adds to the chance of
overconcentration. Using this method of judging a contract seems to
give undo favoritism to those contracts written before the reinsurer has
enough business to threaten overconcentration. From the reinsurer's
point of view, however, once its capacity has been filled, it is less willing to write an additional contract and should be paid handsomely for
doing so. Catastrophe modeling can be used to measure both the individual expected cost and marginal cost.

6

Pricing and Reinsurance Allocation Issues

Simulation models provide a long-needed tool to determine appropriate provisions for catastrophe losses in the primary rates. They can
provide an estimate of the long range expected loss to the peril being
modeled, and they can do this at the zip code level of detail. An actuary
can combine zip codes into homogeneous territories to determine the
appropriate catastrophe pure premium that should be included in the
rate. A significant risk load also is warranted, given the level of uncertainty in writing catastrophic coverages. The loss distribution from the
model can provide a starting point for estimating the risk load.
Similarly, a company can use modeling in determining appropriate
allocations of its reinsurance costs. By running the probabilistic modeling against a company's exposures and its reinsurance program, the
IThe term toss likelihood is used loosely. Loss likelihood refers to the probability
of a specific size loss (0.1 percent) or the return time in the number of years (1/0.1
percent = 1,000 years).
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relative expected losses can be calculated for each layer by zip code.
These expected losses can be combined to give the relative amount
that a territory or state contributes to the catastrophe potential and,
thus, the need for reinsurance. These indicated contributions can be
used by the company in its decisions on rates, profit sharing, or agent
compensation.
When establishing a price for a cover as uncertain as property catastrophe reinsurance the risk load becomes crucial. Actual risk loads
charged in the market are most likely implicit in the market price and
not actuarially determined. Modeling can provide the raw material for
calculating a theoretical risk load for a technically oriented organization. The actuary can determine a measure of variation, e.g., the variance, from the loss distribution that results from a probabilistic model.
This measure can be used to determine an appropriate risk load.

7 Conclusion
The risk of catastrophes to a portfolio of property exposures has
been a problem for insurers in the recent past. The need to measure the
extent of potential damage to a company is crucial, and the recent development of computer simulation modeling has provided techniques
to measure this risk. Catastrophe modeling can be used for managing exposure concentrations, determining reinsurance programs, and
pricing. Rating agencies such as A.M. Best and Standard & Poors require exposure management and catastrophe modeling for companies
to retain a strong financial rating.
Models should be evaluated more for their qualitative value than for
their quantitative value. Models are most useful when comparing the
relative losses from specific events to different locations or different
construction types. Models, however, seem to be graded more upon
their ability to forecast damages from speCific events such as Hurricane Andrew or the Northridge earthquake. To achieve greater individual event accuracy, several additional components need to be modeled.
For hurricane/wind modeling, additional items such as rainfall, storm
duration, humidity, downbursts, etc. need to be modeled. In addition,
more detailed exposure data including door and window detail, roof
sheathing attachment, and roof coverings are needed for more accurate projections of damages from such winds in a single event.
Catastrophe modeling today can be compared to some of the more
rudimentary reserving methods. Neither of these approaches will produce the best answer in many situations; they are both rough estimates.
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Just as a reserving actuary should use a number of reserving methods
to estimate future liabilities, a pricing or reinsurance actuary should
use more than one model when evaluating the catastrophe risk. Every model contains hundreds of assumptions. Scientists and engineers
agree to disagree within their own fields on items such as return times
of events or on the damageability of properties. Until these fields can
come to a consensus, catastrophe models will differ. Recent hearings
of the Florida Hurricane Commission on Loss Projection Methodologies
show that while each model has reasonable assumptions, model results
can vary immensely. As work in the catastrophe modeling field grows
and as exposure data improve, more complicated and precise methods
will develop.
Measuring the risk is only the first step. Management must manage
its concentrations of exposure so that the company is not susceptible to
bankruptcy when a catastrophe occurs. Simulation modeling is a helpful tool in this effort, but must be just one component of an integrated
catastrophe management process.
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Discussion of Ronald T. Kozlowski and Stuart B.
Mathewson's "Measuring and Managing
Catastrophe Risk"
Rade T. Musulin*

1 Introduction
Mr. Kozlowski and Mr. Mathewson's paper provides a good introduction to the development and use of models in the property insurance
industry. It will be a valuable addition to the regrettably sparse actuarialliterature in this area. This discussion will offer several comments
on the ideas raised in the paper, focusing on how models can be used
to enhance an actuary's work.
The use of models has sparked major controversies between regulators and insurers in several jurisdictions, notably Florida. Controversy
is not limited to the regulatory arena, however. Because models are
being used by reinsurers to rate contracts and by A.M. Best to rate companies, management often must react to the application of modeling
to the company. Many insurance company executives find themselves
arguing with regulators for higher primary rate levels based on models
but chafing under reinsurance costs developed using the same models.
*Mr. Musulin, A.C.A.S., M.A.A.A. is vice president and actuary at the Florida Farm
Bureau Insurance Companies. His actuarial duties include property ratemaking, development of concentration control strategies, and reinsurance management. In addition,
he is responsible for the company's legislative affairs and industry relations. He serves
on several industry committees, including the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund Advisory Council. He graduated from Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, in 1979 with
a degree in applied mathematics from the College of Engineering.
Mr. Musulin's address is: Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Companies, P.O. Box 147030,
Gainesville FL 32614-7030, U.S.A. Internet address: Rade@afn.org
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Ratemaking: Models

VS.

Traditional Approaches

Loss Cost Issues

In the introduction the authors discuss how events of the late 1980s
and early 1990s led to severe disruptions in property insurance markets. The factors driving the property insurance crisis are complex and
beyond the scope of their paper. A brief discussion of how traditional
actuarial methods led to errors in estimates of loss costs and probable
maximum losses, however, is an excellent way to emphasize the need
for the development of computer models.
Ratemaking problems developed due to:
• An abnormal lull in catastrophic activity;
• A substantial shift of population to high risk areas;
• Use of actuarial techniques \"'hose basic assumptions were violated by both of the above factors; and
• Limited availability of data and the computer power necessary to
analyze it.
Prior to the late 1980s actuaries used a technique known as the excess wind procedure to estimate hurricane catastrophe provisions in
rates. This technique examines the ratio of excess to normal losses in
statewide aggregations of annual loss data and measures excess losses
as those that exceed some multiple of a long-term mean. Losses above
this threshold are excluded from the traditional five year ratemaking
experience period and spread over a long (30 year) experience period.
This method assumes that the last 30 years were typical in terms of
storm frequency/severity and that the ratio of wind to non-wind (Le.,
fire, theft, and liability) losses is constant over time. Both of these assumptions were grossly violated from 1960 to 1990 by abnormally low
hurricane activity and explosive population growth in coastal areas.
In 1992 the Insurance Service Office calculated an excess wind factor of l.14 for Florida homeowners, which would have generated approximately $80 million in premiums for the entire Florida insurance
industry annually.! At this funding rate it would have taken over 100
IThis figure is developed as follows: Total homeowners premium volume was approximately $1 billion. Assuming an expected loss ratio of 65 percent, this yields $650
million in loss cost, which equals normal losses multiplied by 1.14. Thus, normal losses
were $570 million, leaving $80 million for excess catastrophe losses. While this calculation is a crude approximation of a complicated ratemaking process, it illustrates the
magnitude of the pricing error.
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years just to pay for Hurricane Andrew's homeowner losses, assuming
no other storms in the interim.
Computer modeling techniques now allow actuaries to project the
actual storm data of the 1920s onto the population and construction
patterns of the 1990s, overcoming the limitations of the prior method.

2.2

Risk Load Issues

The authors also discuss the relationship between the purchase of
reinsurance and primary price adequacy. In their Section 1 (fifth paragraph) the authors state "Without reinsurance costs these companies
were able to write business at lower prices and thereby increase their
market share, .... " This raises another significant point about the actuarial techniques employed in the past.
Risk loads generally are considered to be an essential ingredient of
an actuarially sound rate in lines subject to highly variable losses. While
reinsurers long have considered risk load explicitly in their ratemaking,
traditional primary rate making procedures used in property ratemaking did not. Companies that purchase reinsurance and reflected those
costs in primary rates thereby included some risk load.
Standard techniques used by many insurers and rating bureaus for
primary rate making focused on mean loss costs, ignoringiPotential variance of these loss costs. Risk loads were accounted for in profit and
contingency factors often set using rule-of-thumb figures such as 5 percent or industry average return on equity adjusted for anticipated investment income. It has not been unusual for primary profit and contingency factors to be the same for low risk auto physical damage and
high risk coastal homeowners. Even rarer was any consideration of differing risk load within a book of business. One might expect that a risk
load would be different for homeowner risks in coastal areas versus
risks in inland areas, but the notion of varying the risk load within a
filing was virtually nonexistent.
As is the case with loss costs, computer models provide a wealth of
information to actuaries on the variance and skewness of the aggregate
loss distribution. The authors note that modeling provides the raw
material for calculating theoretical risk loads, but they discuss the issue
only in the context of pricing property catastrophe reinsurance. The
issue is also of critical importance in pricing primary insurance; the lack
of generally accepted actuarial and regulatory methods of handling this
problem is related directly to the shortage of primary insurer capacity
in high risk areas.
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Building Models
Exposure Considerations

Their paper discusses the key elements of exposure data needed in
the modeling process. But the actuary should not forget that the exposure on the statistical record may not be the actual level of exposure
on which the loss will be adjusted. For example, many companies offer guaranteed replacement cost coverage that will pay the insured an
amount greater than that shown on the policy declaration if the actual
loss exceeds that amount. This feature contributed to far greater than
expected losses in Hurricane Andre,,,', when a demand surge for materials and labor caused prices to inflate after the loss. The actuary must
understand what policy provisions may be lurking behind the statistical
records in order to accurately use a computer model.
Insurance to value is also critical. Most models assume that property
is insured to 100 percent of replacement cost. If the company insures
to 80 percent of value, the reduction in expected losses will not be 20
percent because most catastrophe losses are not total. 2 The actuary
must work with the modeling vendor to correctly adjust for the actual
insurance-to-value practices of the company.
The authors state in their Section 2.2: "Replacement cost and insurance-to-value provisions identify those provisions where the insurance
coverage may be greater than the specified coverage amount." CompanyspeCific practices in these areas could result in insurance coverage either above or below the speCified coverage amount. For example, most
models assume replacement cost, but the company's contract provisions may provide for actual cash value settlement of contents or roof
claims.

3.2

Statistical Considerations

The authors make a key point that most insurance company property statistical systems are designed for traditional perils of fire and
2For example, consider two $100,000 houses, one insured for $100,000 and the
other for $80,000. A partial loss requiring the roof to be replaced will result in the
same loss to the insurer on both homes. Because only a small proportion of risks is
totally destroyed in a given event, the reduction in insured losses must be less then the
reduction in coverage amount when a book of business' insurance to value standard
is reduced from 100 percent to 80 percent. If actuaries are not careful, a mismatch
of assumption between the modeler and the company can lead to significant errors in
estimated losses.
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theft, rather than wind or earthquake. Thus, the actuary may have detailed coding on whether a home has fire extinguishers or how close
it is to a fire hydrant, but no information on type of roof, existence of
storm shutters, etc. Addressing this issue is perhaps the most daunting challenge modelers face in improving accuracy, given the enormous
expense that is required to change established statistical systems.

3.3

The Authors' Insurance Coverage Module

The reader may gain additional insight into the authors' presentation
of the insurance coverage module by more fully exploring the assumptions underlying their equation (6), which is repeated here for convenience:
(ID)z

iID(Dz,r,d,l)

min[max[(r x D z ) - d, 0], l] + a x Dz
where
(ID)z

Dz
r

d

a

Insured damage at location z;
Damage at location z;
Guaranteed replacement cost multiplier;
Deductible;
Reinsurance limit; and
ALAE percentage.

This form assumes (i) a single risk subject to a per risk excess contract
that does not cover loss adjustment expense; (ii) guaranteed replacement cost applies; and (iii) ALAE is a function of damage (excluding
guaranteed replacement cost and deductible).
If we assume, however, (i) the risk ,,,,ere subject to quota share reinsurance (at percentage q); (ii) guaranteed replacement cost applies; (iii)
ALAE is assumed to be a function of loss adjusted for guaranteed replacement cost before application of the deductible; and (iv) ALAE is
covered under the quota share, then
(ID)z = [max[(r

x Dz) -

d, 0]

+ r x a x Dz] x

(1 - q).

This example illustrates the importance of constructing the insurance
coverage module with a full understanding of the underlying assumptions. Actual insurance coverage models can become extremely complex, particularly if several types of poliCies with differing reinsurance
coverages are involved.

238

4

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.2, 1995

Exposure Management Considerations

The authors discuss several techniques to locate and prevent dangerous concentrations. Their main focus is the aggregate level of exposure in a given area and its density within a given zip code. They
show how models can be used to estimate loss potentials and control
the writing of business in areas of dangerous concentration. I see this
problem from a slightly different perspective. The analysis should not
be limited to the quantity of risk, but also should consider the types
of risks within a given area of concentration, their levels of coverage,
etc. The model can be used to devise strategies (such as making coverage changes) to manage the exposure without necessarily reducing
writings.
The key issue facing a company is how to decide whether $X of aggregate liability can be supported by the company's capitalization and
reinsurance. From this standpoint, $100 million of concrete bunkers
may be as attractive as $10 million of glass greenhouses. Holding construction constant, $100 million in exposure in Inland City may be as
attractive as $20 million in Beach City. The probable maximum loss of a
$100 million aggregate exposure in Inland City at a $250 deductible may
equal a $100 million aggregate exposure in Beach City with a 5 percent
deductible. Comparisons of this type require models-comparisons
cannot be performed by simply looking at aggregations of exposure
on a map.

5 Reinsurance and Excess Modeling
In this section of the paper the authors discuss how modeling can
increase availability of reinsurance coverage in the market. It is also
important to understand the relationship between the use of models
among reinsurers, primary companies, and regulators.
As the authors note, models help reinsurers to measure potential
losses more accurately, increasing their confidence in both pricing and
amount of capital exposed. Unfortunately, unless the reinsured primary company also considers modeled loss costs and an appropriate
risk load in its rates, there will be insufficient funds to pay for needed
reinsurance, leading to the appearance of a capacity shortage. Even if
the reinsurer and primary reinsurer can synchronize their priCing, a
clash between an unregulated reinsurance market and the highly regulated primary market still can pose difficulties. Thus, it is important
that a common understanding of the elements of modeled loss costs
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and needed risk loads be developed between reinsurers, primary insurers, and regulators.
The authors do an excellent job of showing why the traditional practice of using a market share analysis to estimate individual company
loss potential is seriously flawed. I have had firsthand experience with
the pitfalls of using market share-based methods by working for an insurer that specializes in farm insurance. The company's book of business contains a large amount of rural property in Florida. The rural
book's high fire rates cause the premium market share to be substantially higher than the exposure market share. The market share approach also assumes that the farms are distributed in the same manner
as the population, which generally lives much closer to the coast. The
combination of these factors leads to dramatic differences between loss
estimates derived from geocoded exposure data and premium-driven
county market share estimates.
Market share approaches also are biased by the level of rate adequacy in the company, with more adequately rated companies having relatively higher market shares and apparently greater loss potentials. This creates the ironic situation whereby companies that ought
to be viewed more favorably by reinsurers (due to adequate rates and
a greater ability to afford coverage) appear to be less desirable because
their rate-inflated market shares overstate their true catastrophic loss
exposure.
For these reasons, the ability of primary company actuaries to provide their reinsurance counterparts with high quality information is
critical.

6 Pricing and Reinsurance Allocation Issues
The authors state that modeling can be used to help a company
determine the appropriate allocations of reinsurance costs. An often
neglected but important area of actuarial work is the communication
of the components of rate levels to other persons in the organization.
Consider the example of an undenvriter making decisions on agent
performance based on a loss ratio. Often such loss ratios are direct
incurred loss over earned premium, with an adjustment to remove large
or catastrophic losses in consideration for some reinsurance cost. If the
underwriter has two agents writing property insurance, one in Beach
City and another in Inland City, it is likely that the rate level in Beach
City has a significant catastrophic load. If the loss ratio described above
is used without an accurate allocation of the reinsurance cost, the Beach
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City agent can be expected to post a better loss ratio, even if the book
is less profitable. The underwriter could draw inaccurate conclusions
about the profitability of the book and write more business at a less
adequate rate. This could prompt the actuary to raise the price, leading
the underwriter's report to show the Beach City agent to be even more
profitable, and thus continuing the cycle.
In situations such as this, the actuary must use tools such as catastrophe models to assure that internal management information reports
allow users to make accurate decisions. The actuary's job does not end
when the rate filing is approved.

7

Conclusion

Computer modes will become increaSingly important to actuaries in
coming years. An actuary's ability to use these tools effectively is critical to the future health of our organizations and the property insurance
industry as a whole. Actuaries must playa key role in educating the
public about this issue and must combat the impression that models
are incomprehensible black boxes.
Mr. Kozlowski and Mr. Mathewson's paper is an important step to educate the actuarial profeSSion about the development and use of catastrophe models. I share their hope that the paper Vl111 stimulate new
modeling ideas and enhancements.

Authors' Reply to Discussion
Ronald T. Kozlowski and Stuart B. Mathewson
We greatly appreciate the discussion of our paper that Mr. Musulin
has pr0\1ded. It adds further understanding to the use of catastrophe
loss modeling in property insurance management.
Mr. Musulin commented that in 1992 the Insurance Services Office
(ISO) used an excess mnd factor based upon historical loss information. Today ISO recognizes the value of catastrophe modeling and now
. creates loss costs using these same models.
In his discussion of the insurance coverage module, Mr. Musulin
.expands the formula that we offered. We would like to clarify that
the formula in our paper was simply a representative way to view the
process. There are a myriad of possible combinations that will govern
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terms. The equation also varies depending upon whether policy levels
or aggregated exposure data are provided. The discussant has shown
how one of those more complex situations can be represented. We are
grateful for Mr. Musulin's additional equation, as it gives one example
of the complications that can arise in modeling insured loss, given a
certain amount of damages to the insured property.
In Mr. Musulin's discussion of the section on reinsurance and excess
modeling, he re-emphasizes the problem between pricing an unregulated reinsurance market and a highly regulated primary market. In
some states regulators allow catastrophe reinsurance to be loaded as
an expense in primary company rates.
We also would like to add that additional research can improve significantly the results of these models. The insurance industry needs
more information about the long-term history of catastrophic occurrences as well as better information on actual building damage from
these events. Today catastrophe modelers are using historical weather
data from the past 100 years to predict losses at return times of 250
years or more. Current scientific research using pollen dating, coastal
sediment, and tree rings can be used to estimate hurricane severity
thousands of years ago. Earthquake scientists also are using new methods to better estimate earthquake frequency. For instance, paleoscismologists are using evidence from trenching to uncover evidence of
large earthquakes that occurred before records were kept.
We believe that the insurance industry would be best served if insurance companies would pool their catastrophe loss data to validate the
damage functions used in catastrophe models. These data should be
provided in detail by location indicator (e.g., zip code), by construction,
by policy type, and by any other factor deemed important to damage estimation. This type of validation should convince doubters that models
are credible in their calculation of damages
Again, we thank Mr. Musulin for his thoughtful discussion, as it offers Significant additional insight into this area.
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Sensitivity Testing of Prdperty/Casualty Cash Flows
Ralph S. Blanchard, 111* and Eduardo P. Marchena t

Abstract*
The paper outlines an approach that has evolved at Aetna through ten
years of property/casualty insurance cash flow testing. Methodologies and
approaches to setting parameters reflecting both default and call/prepayment
risk are discussed for major invested asset categories. Modeling runoff cash
flows for a base scenario (and, for some of these assets, shocked scenarios) also
is examined for major non-invested asset categories. Loss reserve cash flow
modeling is not addressed, except for a brief description of one approach to
shocking projected flows. Finally, various alternatives are given for presenting
cash flow testing results to management and non-actuarial audiences.
Key words and phrases: interest rate scenarios, assets, liabilities, default risk,
prepayment risk
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Introduction

1

The late 1970s and early 1980s was a time of volatile financial conditions. Interest rates had risen to unprecedented levels. In this environment, statutory annual statements were inadequate to assess a
company's financial condition. This provided the impetus to perform
an analysis focusing on financial strength in its most basic form: the
ability of a company to meet its cash obligations during periods of adverse financial and experience conditions. The first property/casualty
"mismatch", i.e., interest rate risk, analysis was completed by Aetna's
corporate actuarial department in July 1982. It took the form of a cash
flow runoff of the company's December 31, 1981 balance sheet.
Since 1982 the analysis has been performed annually. While the
first study's focus was interest rate risk, the focus has shifted as we
have come to better understand the major risk factors affecting the
property/casualty balance sheet. Today, the analysis focuses on default risk for bonds and commercial mortgages, refinancing risk for
commercial mortgages, certain off-balance sheet risks, and reserve development risk. Interest rate risk is still evaluated, primarily via asset
prepayment scenarios and present value measures, but interest rate
effects are secondary to the other risk factors in their importance to
the overall property/casualty cash flows. This is because of the relatively short duration of property/casualty liabilities,l the lack of any
call risk for these liabilities (unlike many life insurance products),2 and
the fact that the level of liability is not directly a function of interest
rates (again unlike many life insurance products). Our analysis techniques have tended to evolve as the various sources of risk have become
better understood to us (e.g., CMO risk in 1992).3
1 It

is rare to see a total property/casualty ("p/c") company liability duration over 4.

2P/C liabilities are also either fixed or a function of inflation, not a function of
interest rates. PIC liabilities correlation with interest rates exists only to the extent that

interest rates correlate with current inflation. These pic vs.life liability differences also
produce significant contrasts in the focus of our analysis vs. traditional life analysis.
We do not construct life "like" interest rate scenarios and we do not explicitly model
asset reinvestments or disinvestments (the short durations make reinvestment risk a
non-issue). Interest rate scenario issues related to coordinating projected liability cash
flows with asset cash flows are largely "non-issues" for pic.
3 A collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) is a mortgage-backed security supported by a nonproportional sharing of the principal (and/or associated interest) payments from a pool of mortgages. For example, an individual CMO could be supported
by the first (or last) X dollars of principal payments/prepayments. The mortgage principal repayments (and/or their associated interest payments) are separated, based on
repayment date, into short-, medium-, and long-term segments.
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Over the years the results have been presented to senior management and to rating agencies. The analysis also has been used by Aetna's
property/casualty portfolio managers as a tool in understanding the
cash needs of the business (on a runoff basis) and in managing the degree of mismatch between the asset cash flows of their portfolios and
the cash flows of the liabilities. 4
This paper focuses on how we have modeled expected asset cash
flows (following statutory annual statement page 2 line categories) and
the approach we have taken to shocks certain asset categories to reflect
defaults, prepayments, and refinancing (for mortgages). This baseline
and shock modeling have been done on a deterministic, rather than on
a stochastic basis because our focus has been what it would take to
break the bank, not on the probability of surviva1. 6
For non-invested assets, the discussion will be brief except for the
accrued retro premium account (line 9.3).7 We will discuss how we tie
this item to loss assumptions.
Certain items on the liability side also will be discussed, but in a
summary fashion. s The most significant of these liability items are
the emergence of possible adverse loss development and the runoff of
existing unexpired policies.
4While the model only projects runoff flows, some components of it also have been
used to model various ongoing business flows on an ad hoc basis. As the requirements
for dynamic solvency analysis develop, we expect to use more of the model's output
and modules for ongoing business cash flow analysis, with the possible expansion of
the entire model in the future for ongoing business scenarios.
5The term shock is used throughout this paper to refer to the process of subjecting
a financial asset or liability to an extreme scenario.
6We leave a full discussion of stochastic versus deterministic modeling for future
papers. We can say, however, that many of the past property/casualty shocks were not
adequately predicted by stochastic models. For example, the January 1994 Northridge
earthquake was deemed physically impossible by many earthquake risk models before
the event.
7This account reflects future premium collections expected on cost plus (i.e., retro)
policies whereby the final premium is based on actual rather than expected losses.
Due to the tendency of property casualty losses to develop (i.e., increase) over time for
a single policy, premium tends to develop (i.e., increase) over time for a single retro
policy. The result is a stream of retro premium collections almost as long as the loss
payment pattern for a policy, causing significant dollars for this asset account.
S As this paper focuses on asset risk rather than liability risk, only a summary of
liability risks is given here.

246

2

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.2, 1995

Invested Assets

In describing our cash flow analysis and how it begins each year,
the key words are communication, communication, and communication. Reserve issues are identified through discussions with our property/casualty reserve actuaries, cash flow methodology issues are discussed and peer review is solicited from our life actuaries, and invested
asset issues are identified and discussed with our portfolio managers.
These discussions also lead to adjustments in the detail 9 in which the
cash flows are modeled depending on whether there are any significant unique (in terms of cash flow) items buried in the asset or liability
categories of the balance sheet.
For the invested assets we look to the portfolio managers for expertise. We rely on them to provide the asset cash flows under various
scenarios (based on individual asset characteristics).

Bonds (Excluding Mortgage-Backed Securities)10

2.1
2.1.1

Prepayment/Calls Risk

Following these discussions bond cash flows are provided by the
portfolio managers under three prepayment scenarios reflecting a range
of possible interest rate conditions. The scenarios include a baseline
scenario that reflects projected cash flows under current interest rate
expectations, a shortest probable scenario that reflects the largest volume of prepayments expected if interest rates drop, and a longest probable scenario reflecting the least volume of prepayments expected if
interest rates rise .
• Base Case Cash Flow-Callable bonds are assumed to call (or prepay) if the coupon exceeds 150 basis points of projected treasury
returns.!l
• Shortest Probable Cash Flow-All callable bonds call at the earliest opportunity.
9 Detail here refers to the number of different asset or liability classes. Our model
generally deals with aggregate flows for an asset or liability class. Modeling of individual asset detail ''''ithin each class is done, but by our investment area in deriving the
data feeds submitted to us.
10 At the time we were developing our model, the only significant asset -backed securities Aetna held were mortgage-backed securities. Therefore, our model, and hence
our paper, does not address other types of asset-backed securities.
11 For the 1993 analysis interest rates were assumed to rise through 1998 and then remain level. (The 1 SO basis point criterion is specific to the composition of our portfolio.)
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• Longest Probable Cash Flow-Bond cash flows follow prescribed
sinking fund schedules/maturity dates. (Pre-refunded bonds are
assumed to prepay.)
The primary focus of the multiple scenarios is not anyone scenario;
it is the range of results when different cash flows are combined with
other balance sheet cash flows in our model.
The key to reflecting prepayments in our bond cash flows rests with
the modeling capability of our portfolio managers. The database they
currently maintain contains specific contractual terms of each bond
held-whether there is a call provision, the maturity date and coupon
rate, and several other data fields. The database with its associated
software is capable of modifying cash flows in response to specified
criteria.

2.1.2

Default Risk12

The bond cash flows exclude bonds already in default, but make
no allowances for future defaults. Some additional allowance must be
made. Our current methodology does this by first determining a default
rate and then shocking the bond cash flows for various multiples of that
rate. An additional adjustment is made for recoveries from bonds in
default.
Selecting a Default Rate: We currently use three different methods to
produce a default rate and then make a judgmental selection.
The most scientific of our methods is based on the work of Altman
(1989). Altman's principal message is that default risk is partly
a function of time. Bonds rated AAA default less frequently than
bonds rated BBB. But the longer into the future one goes, the more
likely it is that today's AAA bonds will default. This makes intuitive sense, as no rating agency would rate a bond AAA if it faced
significant default risk today. Over time, however, even strong
companies can weaken and default.
Altman includes a table of cumulative default rates by current
bond rating and lag yearP This table is updated annually in a
12This default risk models the risk of defaults across the entire portfolio, not the risk
from asset concentration (Le., a significant portion of assets from a single issuer and
subsequent default of that issuer). To date we have not found asset concentration to
be a problem, partly due to the size of Aetna, and partly due to state laws limiting asset
concentration for property/casualty investment portfolios.
13For example, for bonds currently rated A, he shows the probability of default in
one year, in two years, etc.
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report published by Moody's Investors Service (1994). We ideally
would apply this table of default rates, by bond rating and lag
year, to our bond cash flows, by bond rating and lag year. Instead we have resorted to a simpler calculation, whereby we use
a readily available statutory annual statement schedule (containing summarized principal flows for broad asset classes)14 to produce weighted average portfolio default rates by lag year. (See
Appendix for more details.) This seems to produce reasonable
numbers for about 14 lag years. The data underlying the default
tables are too sparse beyond this period.
Next we analyze our own historical bond default rates. This is a
check on whether the previous method's result is reasonable. It
also quantifies the value added by our own investment department (in their independent analysis of borrower credit risk).
After completing analyses with these two methods we are ready
for a discussion with our investment department. We discuss our
findings with respect to default rate assumptions, ask them what
they think a reasonable default rate is (as our third method), and
select a final estimate.
We currently apply the same default rate assumption to every year
of our bond flows. This is somewhat counter to Altman, whereby
default rates should rise gradually over time. Our response is to
pick a rate that is conservative for the first several years and in
line with what we believe the default rate will be for the middle to
later years.
Applying the Selected Default Rate: After choosing the annual default
rate assumption we apply it to the outstanding bond principal at
each year end. We track the cumulative amount of total outstanding principal defaulted for each year and assume the interest flow
is reduced in the same proportion. For example, if we assume a
2 percent default rate in years 1 and 2, then we assume that 4
percent of year 2 interest disappears.
Default Recoveries: It is rare when a bond defaults for creditors to
lose all their investment. The Moody's report includes an analysis of ultimate recovery rates, i.e., how many cents are recovered
per dollar of prinCipal owed. Default recovery rates calculated this
way are generally between 40 percent and 60 percent. We combine
general data from such sources with input from our investment
14Schedule D - Part lA of the property/casualty statutory annual statement.
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department to select a recovery rate. The selected recovery rate
then is applied to defaulted principal, and a lag of two years between year of default and year of recovery is used to model the
default recoveries.

2.2

Bonds: Mortgage-Backed Securities

2.2.1

Prepayment/Calls Risk

Mortgage-backed securities are instruments whose cash flows depend on the cash flows from an underlying pool of mortgages. As
the mechanism driving prepayments is different from other bonds, our
portfolio managers model these assets separately. Our discussions with
our portfolio managers have focused on two types of these securities:
(i) mortgage pass-through securities, which are a straight percentage
share of a pool of mortgage flows, and (ii) CMOs whereby the owner's
share of the underlying pooled mortgage flows is not proportional.l s
Fabozzi and Ferri (1991, Chapter 2, page 27) state:
The cash flow for each class of CMO can be derived only by
assuming some prepayment rate for the underlying mortgage collateral. The prepayment benchmark used by mortgage-backed securities dealers to quote CMO yields is the
PSA16 standard prepayment model.
In addition, Parseghian (1991, Chapter 29, page 632) states:
The universe of CMO tranches 17 has vastly differing sensitivity to prepayment rates on underlying collateral. To the
extent that this sensitivity causes risk, the investor must be
compensated in the form of yield.
For our model we see only an aggregation of cash flows for these securities. The complex modeling issues related to CMO prepayments at
Aetna are in the realm of portfolio managers. Our focus can be summarized by three questions:
1. Are the base case cash flows realistic in the current environment?
lSOne example of a nonproportional sharing of these flows is to participate instead
in the first X dollars of principal repaid. The varieties of nonproportional sharing of
the underlying mortgage flows (principal and interest) are endless.
16 Authors' note: PSA = Public Securities Association.
17The segments of principal (and/or associated interest) repayments in a CMO are
called trarlches.

250

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.2, 1995

2. How short could the flows get? And
3. How long could the flows get?
From Hu (1990):
A mortgage pool whose prepayment experience conforms to
the PSA pattern is said to prepay at 100 percent of the PSA
model. Any slower or faster prepayment speed is a fraction
or multiple of that PSA model.
From about 1989 to 1992 our portfolio managers used the PSA method
to produce cash flows for different interest rate scenarios. IS In those
years we used 100 percent of PSA for our base case cash flow, ten times
PSA for a scenario reflecting a significant drop in interest rates (Le., high
prepayments,comparable to the shortest probable bond scenario), and
50 percent of PSA for a scenario reflecting a rise in interest rates (Le.,
low prepayments, comparable to the longest probable bond scenario).
In 1992 interest rates fell significantly, however, and as our discussions with portfolio managers progressed in early 1993 we became
aware that the PSA-based model was not doing a good job of modeling
prepayments on our CMOs. With preliminary analysis results already in
hand, our portfolio managers provided new cash flows for CMOs. Reflecting the heavy volume of prepayments, the new flows showed substantially more cash in the early runoff years and substantially less in
total. This strengthened our financial position with respect to interest
rate risk at least, because the new asset cash flows were well-matched
to our liability cash flOWS. 19
Our portfolio managers continue to provide us with asset cash flows
and prepayment scenarios reflecting separate treatment for mortgagebacked securities. The modeling techniques for these assets have been
changing, however, since the need became apparent during the 1992
cash flow analysis. For our 1993 analysis our three mortgage-backed
security cash flow scenarios were developed according to the following
interest rate assumptions:
IBThey also had the capability to develop expected prepayment rates based on the
specific characteristics of each security held. The expected rate reflected two classes
of factors: (i) demographic turnover (factors related to the personal characteristics of
the mortgagor, e.g., persons tend to move after a certain number of years); and (ii)
refinancing activity (factors reflecting the economic motivation of the mortgagor).
19This is not unexpected for property/casualty insurance, as most property casualty
companies manage their assets to a higher duration than their liabilities. This purposeful mismatch results from a lack of call risk on the PIC liabilities. Given the lack
of call risk, companies typically manage first to meet liquidity needs and then to maximize yield (by going long on the assets). The model being discussed is one way for PIC
companies to evaluate the risk this strategy takes.
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• Base Case Cash Flow-Interest rates remain at current levels.
• Shortest Probable Cash Flow-Interest rate decrease 300 basis
points from current levels.
• Longest Probable Cash Flow-Interest rates increase 300 basis
points from current levels.
In determining these scenarios we asked portfolio managers for the
longest and shortest cash flows possible in the context of changing
interest rates (as well as their current base expectation).' In their judgment the 300 basis point range produced the cash flow effects (on our
portfolio) consistent with our request.
Our experience with mortgage-backed security prepayments highlights a crucial point that applies to all our cash flows and to modeling generally: methods or experience that produced reasonable estimates in the past may not produce reasonable estimates in the future.
Again, the key to ensuring the validity of the modeled asset cash flows is
communicatiori with those who are managing the assets and modeling
the expected asset cash flows. They will know if economic conditions
are producing asset behavior that is unexpected or differs significantly
from past models.

2.2.2

Default Risk

For purposes of default we have not developed a separate approach
(or rate) for mortgage-backed securities. The cash flows for these assets
are aggregated with those of our other bonds, and the default methodology is applied in our model.
This is consistent with how the bond default selections are made.
The analysis using bonds by NAIC rating class includes all bonds, including mortgage-backed ones. Therefore, we believe that, in total, our
bond default assumptions are reasonable. The default assumptions
should vary, however, if separate assumptions are made for mortgagebacked bonds versus noncollateralized bonds. Many mortgage-backed
securities include government agency guarantees (e.g., Ginnie Maes)
with minimal, if any, default risk.
This aggregation of all bond types for default risk purposes raises
an important issue, namely the importance of defining in advance the
scope of investment department discussions. Investment departments
may not be organized in accordance with annual statement page 2 asset
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categories. 2o Separate departments may exist for private versus publicly traded, mortgage-backed versus noncollateralized, and/or government versus corporate bonds. When discussing asset risk parameters,
care should be taken that all relevant portfolio managers are represented. Otherwise, one may find that the value selected to measure
asset risk is reasonable only for a small segment of the assets in question.

2.3
2.3.1

Commercial Mortgages 21
Prepayment/Calls Risk

When we raised the issue of modeling commercial mortgage prepayment behavior with our portfolio managers, the discussion was short.
Our portfolio managers looked quizzically at each other and answered
"Mortgages don't prepay."
Of course, our portfolio managers were not talking about residential mortgages. They were speaking about our portfolio of commercial
mortgages. Because commercial property owners "'Tith mortgages MIl
pass the cost of their mortgage debt to renters, the prepayment behavior of these assets is different-they tend not to prepay. Also, in the
economic climate of the early 1990s for commercial real estate, it was
difficult for commercial mortgage loan holders to refinance even if they
wanted to. This was a time of falling property values and tight creditprepayments were not a major issue. Under different circumstances a
more careful analysis of the expected prepayments may be necessary.
The significant issues in modeling commercial mortgage loan cash
flows are default (and refinancing) and the underlying property values.

2.3.2

Default/Refinancing Risk

Our default analysis starts with the mortgages' contractual flows,
with principal and interest flows separated, and balloon principal separated from other scheduled principal. Unfortunately, in the economic
environment of the early 1990s contractual flows are probably not going to be realized, particularly for balloon mortgages. Therefore, our
20The balance sheet is shown on the statutory annual statement pages 2 and 3 (assets
and liabilities/surplus, respectively).
21 We only address commercial mortgages because residential mortgage investments
are rare. Mortgages in general are rare investments for most pic companies. Aetna
has been an exception. In 1994 Aetna represented only about 2.3 percent of the pic
industry's invested assets, but held nearly 48 percent of the industry's mortgages.
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portfolio managers adjust the contractual mortgage flows to the extent
that actual flows are expected to differ from the original contract terms.
These adjustments are for specifically identified problem or near problem loans. Adjustments include refinancing loans (in which case our
receipt of principal is delayed but we receive more interest payments),
retiring the loan but at a reduced amount, and foreclosure.
The refinancing risk is primarily in balloon mortgages. For these
mortgages scheduled payments are generally interest only, with the entire principal balance (the balloon) due upon maturity. For commercial
mortgages the balloon can be large. The borrower typically never ex·
pects to pay the debt, but instead to continually roll it over, i.e., pay the
balloon with proceeds from a new loan. This may have worked during
the real estate craze of the 1980s, but when real estate values dropped
and credit tightened these borrowers found that they could not obtain
refinanCing. As lenders we are left with a choice: either foreclose or
extend the loans.
The flows adjusted by portfolio managers reflect defaults, but only
to the extent that defaults are known or considered likely on specific
mortgages. In the language of asset impairment reserves, specific impairments are reflected, general impairments are not. Therefore, to
arrive at our base case mortgage cash flows including future default
risk, we apply a selected default rate to the cash flows. The algorithm
used to model the defaults is the same as for bonds. The assumptions
on default rate, recovery rate, and lag between default and recovery,
however, must be reviewed and changed if appropriate.
For the recovery rate and lag we generally have taken a fairly broad
approach. These assumptions have been selected based upon discussions with our portfolio managers. (We generally look for assumptions
that they judge to be reasonable but on the conservative side.) For the
default rate we test the effects of various default rates and then discuss the various impacts with our mortgage portfolio managers. One
perspective that we have found helpful is the reduction to the all time
yield (in basis points) of the portfolio as implied by the cash flows. This
can be measured by calculating the internal rate of return of the flows
before and after application of the default rate. (All you need are the
beginning outstanding principal and the cash flows.)
With the base case mortgage cash flows set through this process,
more adverse scenarios of mortgage experience are modeled by shocking the flows at multiples of the base default rate.
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Other Invested Assets (Including Stocks)

Other invested assets include cash and short-term investments, stock,
and real estate. At Aetna these assets are small in relation to bonds and
mortgages, and our approach to modeling them is correspondingly simple. We generally have assumed that these assets are converted to cash
in the first year of the runoff.22
One exception is real estate. It may not be reasonable to assume
that real estate can be sold within a year. Therefore, in our most recent
analysis we differentiate between investment grade and foreclosed real
estate and assume that the latter produces a three year cash flow at
less than the current GAAP value.
In evaluating these asset categories it is important to keep in mind
that we are performing a runoff analysis, not a fire sale. This should be
considered before one starts to convert occupied real estate and stock
of affiliates to cash. We do not reflect any cash flows from these assets
in our analysis.

3

Non-Invested Assets

The largest annual statement non-invested asset categories are typically agents balances (page 2, line 9 of the annual statement), reinsurance recoverable on loss payments (page 2, line 12), and interest,
dividends, and real estate income due and accrued (page 2, line 15).
With the exception of the accrued retrospective premiums (the portion
of agents balances relating to cost plus or retro policies, see footnote
7), we assume that the cash is received in the first year of the runoff.
We have not performed any analysis of collection risk associated with
these items, relying instead on statutory non-admitted asset rules and
Schedule F penalties 23 to reflect collection risk. We do not reflect any
cash flow for items such as property and equipment.

3.1

Accrued Retrospective Premiums (A.S. Page 2, Line 9.3)

Aetna has been a large commercial lines writer of retrospectively
rated (Le.,retro) policies in the auto, general liability, and workers' compensation lines of business. Hence, this asset has been significant for
22Transaction costs of the sale could be reflected through a reduction to the assumed
cash flow.
23Schedule F is the property/casualty annual statement schedule showing information on reinsurance transactions. Parts 4 through 7 are used to develop a penalty,
essentially a formula-based credit risk reserve for reinsurance collection risk.
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us. In our analysis we group this asset with our liabilities (showing it
as a negative outflow) because the expected additional premiums are
directly connected to the losses on this business. There are two aspects
of the expected cash flows that we "'ill discuss here: the runoff of the
held retro premium reserve and adverse loss development scenarios.
The runoff (lines 9.3 and related impacts on lines 9.2 and 9.1)Agents balances (page 2, line 9) are split in the annual statement into
three pieces:
line 9.1 Premiums and agents' balances in course of collection;
line 9.2 Premiums and agents' balances and installments booked but
not yet due;
line 9.3 Accrued retrospective premiums.
When projecting how the accrued retrospective premium asset runs
off, one must recognize that modeling the runoff of this asset is not
the same as modeling cash receipts.
The retro premium reserve represents future premiums to be written as reported incurred losses (paid plus case basis reserves) develop
on retrospectively rated poliCies. As the losses emerge, the additional
premium is booked and then billed (Le., there is a shift-line 9.3 goes
down and 9.1 goes up). As the bill is paid, line 9.1 goes down and cash
goes up. On our book of business, hm''I'ever, it is not this straightforward. For some retro policies the amount of premium booked is based
on reported incurred losses, but the amount billed is based on reported
paid losses. In this case line 9.3 goes down by the amount booked, line
9.1 goes up by the amount billed, and line 9.2 goes up by the difference
between the booked and billed premium. (For statutory accounting, the
amount in line 9.2 must be secured by a bank letter of credit or other
collateral; otherwise it is non-admitted.)
To reflect how the retro premium asset converts to cash (and also
how line 9.2 becomes cash), it is necessary to understand the various
billing arrangements available to the insured. In our case the cash is
received more slowly than a pure runoff of the line 9.3 asset would
indicate.
Retro premiums and adverse loss development-While not a focus
of this paper, adverse loss development scenarios are a major focus of
our cash flow analysis. To model these adverse scenarios appropriately,
it is necessary to recognize that with higher losses more retro premiums
will be collected than what is anticipated by the held retro premium
reserve. In our analysis we reflect additional retro premiums (above
the held reserve level) in the following way:
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• First, we separately identify how much of auto, general liability,
and workers' compensation loss reserves are associated with retro
policies.
• We assume that the loss payment pattern is the same for both
guaranteed cost and retrospectively rated business and that adverse loss payments in each runoff year are split in the same proportion as the original reserves.
• For each runoff year we associate the marginal amount of increased loss payments with a marginal increase in reported case
reserves. We produce the case reserve increase by assuming that
the case reserves will anticipate the future adverse loss payments
for a specified horizon (Le., a specified number of future years).24
• For each runoff year the product of the marginal increase in reported case reserves and a retrospective premium responsiveness factor (developed through a separate review of the retrospective premium reserve) produces the additional retro premium
received. The responsiveness factor is a ratio representing the
expected additional premiums per dollar of additional reported
loss. The factor incorporates, in aggregate, the individual characteristics of all our retrospectively rated accounts, e.g., speCified
aggregate loss limitations (maximums on the retro contract).
Via an interpolation formula in our cash flow spreadsheet we
cause the responsiveness factor to vary inversely with the severity of the loss development scenario. This reflects the fact that at
higher levels of loss development more insureds will reach their
maximums and the additional retro premiums received will diminish in relation to the amount of additional losses.
We show the additional retro premiums received as offsets to the
loss payments (Le., negative outflows).

4

Loss Development

Our base case projected loss and loss adjustment expense payments
are produced by mUltiplying the held reserve levels by a reserve payout
24The shocked reserves of year X equal the base case reserves of year X plus the
impact of the shock on payments for next Y years. The choice of Y allows for a gradual
recognition of the shock in the reserves.
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pattern. 25 These payout patterns are developed in a separate analysis
and are in the annual statement Schedule P line detail. 26
We describe one algorithm that can be used to produce loss payments given a targeted adverse loss development scenario. There is no
one right way to do this, however. This method should be viewed as
appropriate for a plain vanilla analysis where the primary objective is
to mechanically vary loss payments, in both amount and timing, over a
range of scenarios. The easiest way to describe the algorithm is with a
few formulas.
Let H represent the current held loss and loss adjustment expense
reserve and Pi represent the base loss and loss adjustment expense
payout in runoff year i, for i = 1,2, ... , n where n is the number of
years needed to retire all current liabilities. Then
n

H=2:,h

(1)

i=l

Next we let T be the targeted development scenario. (For example, if
the scenario represents projected loss payments exceeding the held
reserves by 10 percent, then T = 1.IH.) For each runoff year assume
that the payments under the adverse scenario are related to the base
scenario by a constant factor c raised to a power, where the power is
the index of the runoff year, i.e.,
n

T

=

2:, PiC i •

(2)

i=l

Equation (2) is just a polynomial of degree n in c and can be solved
for the unknown c using standard numerical techniques such as the
Newton-Raphson method; see, for example, Burden and Faires (1985,
Chapter 2). Use of the exponential relationship lengthens the payout
pattern relative to the base pattern, but this may be a reasonable way
to model the adverse payments. (One could take the view there is relatively more uncertainty associated with the projected payments far
into the future than with the'projected payments in nearer years.) Most
of the dollars of development
occur early in the runoff 27 because
the volume of loss payments is much greater in these years than in the
outer years.

""ill

25There are some components of the held reserve that are excluded because no reasonable base payout pattern can be developed, e.g., for asbestos reserves.
26Schedule P is the analytical loss schedule-showing loss information by accident
year-of the property/casualty annual statement.
27This will tend to be true for all but the most extreme levels of targeted development.
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At high levels of development and with long tailed lines of business this method may put more development in the tail than is desired.
To add more flexibility in controlling the timing of the additional loss
payments we have modified the approach by dividing the polynomial
into two sections. (Newton's method applies.) For earlier payments the
same expression is used, with the increasing exponent, up to a specified year. After the specified year, say runoff year m, the exponent
is kept constant (Le., PiCi is replaced with PiCm for i ~ m + 1). This
allows us to maintain the original pattern or to vary the lengthening of
the pattern anywhere between this (no change) and the full exponential
approach.

5 Other Liabilities
5.1

Unearned Premium Reserve (UPR)

The unearned premium reserve reflects a commitment to provide
loss coverage for a limited period following the balance sheet date. In
our analysis we reflect this future commitment by developing an expected combined ratio for the unexpired portion of currently in-force
business. The product of this combined ratio and the UPR, less prepaid
expenses, produces the total future outflows associated with the UPR.
To obtain cash flows we apply a loss and loss adjustment expense payout pattern to the total loss amount and assume that other expenses
(excluding prepaid expense) are paid in the first runoff year. The loss
and loss adjustment expense payout pattern for the UPR should reflect
that the loss exposure is not even over the UPR coverage period, Le., the
highest exposure is in the first quarter and exposure then decreases in
each future quarter. This shortens the payout pattern relative to an
accident year pattern.
The method described requires the UPR to be an appropriate measure of the future loss exposure as of the balance sheet date. This
may not be true, however, depending on how premiums are booked.
For some of our commercial lines business premium is accounted on a
booked-as-billed basis. The amount of written premium that is booked
depends on the billing arrangement of the policy and does not necessarily represent the full term premium of the policy. Likewise, the unearned premium reserve for the policy does not reflect the total future
loss exposure on the policy.28 Therefore, when we project the future
28For example, suppose a $120 annual policy is billed in four quarterly installments,
and the premium is booked as billed. Then the booked written premium at the begin-
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outflows on the UPR we first adjust the UPR upward for these not yet
booked or earned premiums. These premiums also represent future
cash inflow.
Finally, our model includes the capability to shock the future loss
payments on the UPR according to the adverse (shocked) loss development scenario selected. This is done by runoff year by taking the ratio
of shocked to unshocked loss payments on the loss reserves and then
applying this ratio to loss payments on the UPR. (We do this for all lines
combined, not line by line.)

5.2

Accrued Expense and Other Liabilities

These liabilities include various accounts payable (including outstanding general expenses), funds held on account of others, and various accruals. For the insurance liabilities all we do is assume that the
balance sheet amount is paid in the first runoff year.
Insurance liabilities are highlighted because we perform our analysis on two separate balance sheets. One balance sheet includes only the
insurance liabilities and only those assets supporting those liabilities.
(We maintain separate investment portfolios, one to support insurance
liabilities and one to support statutory surplus.) The other balance
sheet includes assets supporting surplus plus several corporate liabilities such as accruals for postretirement benefits other than pensions
(OPEBs, FAS 106) and corporate debt. We limit our discussion of OPEBs
to an observation that they are of long duration.

5.3

Taxes

A detailed discussion of taxes is beyond the scope of this paper.
Furthermore, in our analysis we have taken a broad brush approach to
the tax question, and we feel this is reasonable in the context of the
intended use of the analysis.
In most of our past analyses we have ignored the effect of taxes.
The purpose of our analysis is to see if we can withstand extreme shock
scenarios, not to forecast future expectations. We always have assumed
that these shocks would be so severe that federal income tax payments
would be zero.
We recently have included a rough tax calculation in our model involving a calendar year taxable income base for each year of the runoff
ning of each quarter is $30, and the associated unearned premium is $30. The balance
sheet unearned premium reserve will not reflect the full loss exposure committed to
under the policy.
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and a calculation of the incurred tax payable. This requires tracking any
net operating loss carryforwards available to the company; splitting investment income to taxable versus nontaxable components; tracking
future investment income and losses from defaults; and tracking reserve runoffs, reserve strengthening, and the associated tax loss reserve
discount factors. We have not reflected any alternative minimum tax in
the tax flows.
One significant question in modeling the timing of (ax flows is how
to model the loss and loss adjustment expense reserve balances. Our
loss development method produces higher loss payments in the runoff
years which in total equal a selected target development. The question
is to what extent do the loss reserves anticipate the future adverse loss
payments at each runoff year end (Le., how is the reserve funded to
meet the adverse loss payments)? Our approach has been to specify a
certain horizon of future years adverse loss payments that the reserve
responds to (for example, shocked year i reserve = unshocked year i
reserve + shock payments for the next j years). The number of years in
the horizon can vary, but we usually have assumed three to five years.

6 Presentation Techniques
Over the years presentation techniques for the results have varied.
The intended message is always focused on the company's current ability to pay claims, however, and that only a cash flow analysis of this type
can measure this ability.
Furthermore, we always have focused first on this financial strength,
using only those assets supporting our reserves. (We begin with assets
equal to insurance liabilities - statutory basis, Le., no surplus included.)
In this way we uncover our balance sheet financial strength, shOwing
our ability to meet adversity without drawing on existing company surplus. We believe that this makes the message even stronger.
Getting the message across requires the use of various measures
that quantify this financial strength. We have used amounts of nominal net cash flow, cash flow net present value, and internal rate of
return. These have been combined in various matrix formats to show
the various combinations of interest rate, asset default, and reserve development risks that have been evaluated. The simplest formats are
those that are most consistently well received.
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Nominal Net Cash Flows

Presenting the nominal cash flows-asset inflows, liability outflows,
net flow-is an effective way to communicate the financial strength
available to meet company obligations. What this can show for balance
sheet assets and liabilities is the amount by which expected asset cash
flows exceed expected liability cash flows. This excess cash flow would
be available to help manage the possibility of future adverse experience
or, if this did not occur, would emerge as profit. Table 1 shows both
the total amounts of the flows and the timing of the flows. Figures 1
and 2 are based on the data in Table 1.

Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Totals

Table 1
Data
Inflow Outflow
3.70
4.00
2.50
1.70
1.40
1.50
0.90
1.60
0.80
1.60
0.70
1.10
1.00
0.70
0.60
0.70
0.40
0.60
0.30
0.40
0.20
0.30
0.10
0.10
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.10
0.05
0.09
0.05
0.06
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.06
0.04
13.00
15.00

Netflow
-0.30
-0.80
0.10
0.70
0.80
0.40
0.30
0.10
0.20
0.10
0.10
0.00
0.01
0.09
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.02
2.00
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Figure 1
Runoff Cash Flow by Year
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The graph of the net flow (inflow less outflow), depicted in Figure
2, is also one that we have used frequently. It highlights the years
with negative cash flows and the years with positive cash flows. These
figures provide information that is easy to understand. In certain situations, however, they are handicapped by not providing a single number
as an overall summary.

6.2

Present Value

Cash flow present values are also an important measure in our analysis. Present values have been used in two ways.
• First, for our cash flow report we have included present values for
many shock scenarios including the boundary scenarios (where
the present value of the net cash flow equals zero). The report
focuses on the range of answers and not the results of anyone
scenario.
• Second is the situation where we have needed to show financial
strength in one or two slides or exhibits. Talking about many sce-
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Figure 2
Net Cash Flow by Year
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narios distracts from the balance sheet financial strength. Therefore, in this situation we have presented results for a single scenario, our base case scenario. The net cash flow present value
is easy to quote. A disadvantage to present value, however, is
that the number can draw attention from the main message of
financial strength. Questions to us have included: Is this a market value? Is the discount rate before or after tax? What is the
assumed borrowing versus reinvestment rate? etc., etc.
The fundamental difficulty is choosing a discount rate for the present
value calculation that everyone feels is appropriate. A possible solution
is to present the answer as "the present value at x% is equal to y" and
be ready with several other answers at different discount rates.
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Internal Rate of Return

Like the present value, the internal rate of return ORR) is easy to
quote. In addition, the IRR avoids the argument over what discount
rate to use, and it communicates well to investment persons.
The IRR is not easily understood by non-investment persons, and it
provides less information than nominal flows. One misinterpretation is
that the IRR is the highest rate that the asset cash flows can withstand
and still be sufficient to meet the liability cash flows. This is true only
for constant interest rate scenarios. Finally, the IRR does have some
limitations, e.g., sometimes the IRR is not a unique positive number.
In our cash flow report we use the IRR to provide the border interest
rate (Le., the interest rate where the present value of the net cash flows
equals zero for a given combination of asset default and reserve development assumptions). We generally focus on the year to year changes
in the IRR. If the IRR changes Significantly, this usually is a signal to do
more work to understand why the change occurred (sometimes uncovering problems with the data).
Generally we limit IRR use to our own analytical purposes and to
situations where the intended audience is familiar with it.
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Appendix
This appendix demonstrates an application of Altman's (1989) method
to Schedule D - Part lA data.
1. From Schedule D, Part lA, schedule the amount of bond principal
still outstanding by year, by rating. For example, class 1 bonds

outstanding in year 5 include bonds maturing in years six through
ten, ten through 20, and over 20 years.29 Government bonds are
pulled as if they were a separate rating group, as we assume they
have a percent default rate.

°

2. The annual statement shows bonds by NAIC classes 1 through 6.
Default rates come in rating groups AAA through B. This requires
a translation of the above data by NAIC class into default table
rating groups.

Classes 2 through 4 translate directly into specific ratings (BBB,
BB, and B). Class 1, containing AAA though A, was translated into
a rating of AA.30 Classes 5 and 6 were grouped with those rated B.
(This may distort the final answer for a company with significant
class 5 and 6 bonds due to the high default rates for these bonds,
although this is minimized due to NAIC rules restricting these
investments.)31

3. Translate the cumulative default probabilities from the default
table into incremental default probabilities.
4. Apply these incremental default probabilities by rating and lag
year against outstanding bonds by rating and default year to get
default rates by year.
29Schedule D, Part lA includes bonds by broad maturity ranges: 1 or less, 2-5, 6-10,
11-20, over 20. We translate these ranges into maturity years of 1, 3, 7, 15, and 25.
Only the first 20 years were used, however, as default rates are not published beyond
20 lag years.
30This has minimal impact, as default rates in the tables vary little between A, AA,
and AM ratings.
31 An additional problem exists in that bonds below class 2 (rating BBB, which is
the lowest rating for investment grade bonds) are carried at market in the property/casualty annual statement. Therefore Schedule D, Part lA would tend to underestimate the level of lower rated bonds in the predefault bond cash flows. This bias
would be hidden where coupon rates are above current yields and exacerbated when
coupon rates are below current yields.
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Numerical Example of Default Rate Calculation
Steps 1 & 2-Schedule amount of bond principal outstanding, by year,
by rating. See Tables 1 and 2.

Class
1

Table 1
Excerpt From Schedule D, Part lA *
Quality and Maturity Distribution of Bonds
Range of Maturities in Years
Total
< 1 Year
1-5
5-10
10-20
> 20
27,034
56,306 77,989 80,790 32,173 274,291

*Using 1994 Best's Aggregates & Averages

Table 2
Assumed Outstanding Principal of Bonds by Rating Group
Year
Rating
2
4
Class
1
3
Gov't
138,954 122,347 122,347 66,418
AAA
274,291 247,258 247,258 190,952
1
AA
A
27,864
24,906
24,906
18,090
2
BBB
3,246
3,246
2,460
BB
3,455
3
4-6
2,539
2,539
1,974
B or Lower
2,701
Total

446,905

400,296

400,296

279,894

Notes: Class 1 bonds are assumed to be AA. Year 1 outstanding (O/S) is total
principal for the class; Beginning year 2 O/S = year 1 O/S, minus year 1 maturities;
Beginning year 4 O/S = year 3 O/S, minus 1-5 year maturities (assuming principal
matures at the midpoints of the intervals, e.g., 3.5 years for the 1-5 year maturities);
etc.

Step 3-Translate cumulative default probabilities to incremental default probabilities, e.g., cumulative AA default rate at three and four
years equals 0.001 and 0.002 respectively;32 therefore, incremental de32A table of cumulative default rates is published annually by Moody's Investors
Service. To get the incremental rates from the cumulative default table, one must take
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fault rate for year 4 is (0.002 - 0.001)/0 - 0.001) = 0.001. These
incremental default probabilities are shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Incremental Default Assumptions (Moody's, 1994)
Year
3
1
2
4
AAA
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0%
AA
A

BBB
BB
B or Lower

0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
1.8%
8.3%

0.0%
0.1%
0.3%
2.6%
7.1%

0.1%
0.2%
0.4%
2.6%
6.6%

0.1%
0.2%
0.6%
2.7%
5.5%

Step 4-Weight incremental default rates by rating and lag year against
outstanding bond principal by rating and lag year to get average default
rates by year:
Table 4
Average Default Rates
Year
2
1
3
All Rating Groups 0.08% 0.09% 0.15%

4
0.17%

the conditional probability of default in year 11, given that default does not occur before
year n. If'C(n) is the cumulative default rate through year n, then the incremental
default rate is [C(n) - C(n -1)]/[1 - C(n - 1)].
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A Pension Plan Incorporating Both Defined Benefit
and Defined Contribution Principles
M. Zaki Khorasanee*
Abstract t
We propose a defined contribution pension plan with an explicitly defined
benefit formula. Such a plan is expected to pay more stable and predictable
benefits over time than one based on the money purchase principle. The properties of the plan are investigated through simulation. Methods for distributing
surpluses and eliminating deficiencies that involve adjusting the rate of benefit accrual (rather than varying the rate of contribution) are discussed. The
behavior of the plan under a scenario of persistently unfavorable investment
experience is Simulated, and methods for satisfactorily dealing with such a scenario are considered. The plan actuary is expected to play an important role
in maintaining an appropriate balance between solvency and stability.
Key words and phrases: money purchase plan, Simulation, equity index, investment

1 Introduction
1.1

Defined Contribution Plans

Defined contribution pension plans 1 are growing in popularity in
the United Kingdom (U.K.). In countries such as the U.S.A. and Australia
*M. Zaki Khorasanee, B.A., F.I.A., is a lecturer in the Department of Actuarial Science
and Statistics at City University, England. He obtained his B.A. degree in 1985 from
Cambridge University and has worked for six years as a pension actuary with various
consulting firms in, the London area.
Mr. Khorasanee's address is: Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics, City
University, Northampton Square, London ECl V OHB, England. Internet address:
m.z.khorasanee@city.ac.uk

tThe author would like to acknowledge the help of his colleague Professor Steven
Haberman whose comments on earlier drafts of this paper have improved both the
presentation and content of the final version.
1A pension plan (U.S.A. and Canada) is termed a pension scheme in the U.K.
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such plans are being established by employers of all sizes. The principal
advantages to the sponsoring employer of a defined contribution plan,
compared with a defined benefit plan, are:
• Stable contributions, normally a fixed percentage of the pensionable payroll;
• No risk of insolvency, thus no possibility that the plan can represent a liability for the employer;
• Freedom from compliance with legislation aimed at defined benefit plans.
The risks associated with poor investment performance are transferred to employees, who no longer can rely on their employers to pay
additional contributions in order to support a fixed benefit scale. Thus,
a report commissioned by the U.K. government (1993) recommends
that active members of defined contribution plans should appoint at
least two-thirds of the trustees. Although this proportion was reduced
to one third in subsequent legislation, the logic of allowing members
to assume responsibility for the assets of a defined contribution plan
seems inescapable, as members are the ones who will bear the adverse
consequences of any mismanagement of assets.

1.2

Money Purchase Approach

Will a rational group of employees want its defined contribution plan
to run on the money purchase principle?2 Although this is the approach
normally taken, it involves a considerable degree of investment risk for
individual members, given that:
• Equities generally are accepted as the most suitable asset class for
long-term savings because they are believed to be a hedge against
inflation and because they are expected to provide superior returns to other assets; and
• The return from equities has been, and probably will continue
to be, highly variable, so the fund accumulated by an individual
member will depend greatly on whether his or her period of membership happens to coincide with a period of favorable or unfavorable investment experience.
2In most defined contribution plans each member's accumulation of benefit is directly linked to the return on the assets of the fund over the same member's period of
service. This is sometimes called the money purchase principle.
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A comparison by Bodie (1989) based on historic U.K. investment and
earnings data for a money purchase plan in which contributions of 10
percent of earnings were invested in ordinary shares shows that the
pension of an employee with 20 years of service retiring in one of the
years from 1970 to 1987 would have varied between 13 percent and 41
percent of final salary.
1.3

Defined Benefit Approach

Most defined benefit plans provide benefits based on employee remuneration. This satisfies the salutary objective of providing the pensioner an income commensurate ·with that received while working.
The most common benefit formula grants a fixed fraction of final
salary for each year of service with the sponsoring employer. This formula directly links income received immediately before and after retirement; however, anomalies can arise if employees are subject to unusually large changes in salary close to retirement. Some pension plans
have dealt with this problem by adopting a benefit formula based on
career average salary, where each salary figure is increased on an index
of wage or price inflation over the period to retirement.
One of the most important features of these plans compared with
money purchase plans is the reduction in benefit uncertainty for individual members, especially if benefits are measured in real rather than
in nominal terms. Real salary increases are much less variable than
are real investment returns. This reduction in benefit uncertainty is
possible because of two characteristics of defined benefit plans:
• The sponsoring employer varies the rate of contribution in accordance with the financial position of the fund;
• Surpluses and deficits arising from investment volatility are tolerated, effectively smoothing volatile investment returns between
different generations of employees.
Although the first characteristic cannot, by definition, be part of a defined contribution plan, there is no reason why the second characteristic should not be. Thus, some defined contribution plans operate with
an investment reserve, in order to smooth out variability in benefits
for retiring members. The objective of this paper is to examine one
possible way of running such a plan, in which elements of the defined
benefit approach are adopted.
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1.4

Integrating Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution
Approaches

We examine the possibility of operating an integrated plan, i.e., a
defined contribution plan with a defined benefit scale. In this case
the defined benefit scale is linked to career average revalued salary.
Such a benefit scale represents the ultimate smoothing of investment
returns. Carr (1988) observes that a defined benefit scale based on
career average revalued salary is similar to a money purchase plan in
which each member's fund accumulates at the same real rate of interest.
This integrated plan deviates from the pure defined benefit approach
in one important respect: the rate of benefit accrual will vary, its value
depending on the current surplus/deficit of fund assets over accrued
liabilities. Thus, the response to a deficit is to reduce the accrual rate
for future service (rather than to increase the contribution rate as in a
pure defined benefit plan). Moderate surpluses can be tolerated as a
safety margin against future adverse experience; an excessive surplus
is handled through a fixed percentage increase in the accrued benefits
of existing members.
To my knowledge, no integrated pension plan based on the principles described above exists. As such, this paper examines the feasibility
of the proposed plan solely from an actuarial viewpoint. Only when the
merits and demerits of the plan on actuarial grounds have been considered would it be appropriate to consider legislative concerns.

2 The Model Pension Plan
2.1

Main Characteristics

Our model integrated plan has the follOwing properties:
• A single member at each age from 25 to 64 inclusive;
• The same fixed pensionable salary for each member;
• An employer contribution for each member of one unit 3 per annum, paid annually in advance;
• No employee contributions;
• No mortality before age 65;
3We use currency units adjusted for wage inflation. It follows that the fixed contribution per member is effectively a fixed proportion of salary.
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• All members who leave service before retirement are replaced by
new entrants of identical age and salary;
• All retirements occur at age 65;
• Each active member retiring at age 65 is replaced by a new entrant
age 25.
In addition, the following notation is used throughout the paper:
S(x, t)

B(x, t)

rna
a(t)

bt
B(t)
AL(t)

SF(t)
SR(t)
FR(t)
F(t)
D(t)

AVRF

2.2

Annual pensionable salary over next year of
a member age x at time t;
Accrued lump sum benefit, payable at age 65,
of a member age x at time t;
Target fraction of career average earnings per year of
pensionable service;
Additional benefit awarded to each member for each unit
of benefit accrued at time t;
Fraction of target accrual rate applied during [t, t + 1);
Benefit outgo of plan at time t;
Value of accrued liabilities at time t;
Entry age normal standard fund at time t;
Solvency ratio at time t;
Funding ratio at time t;
Market value of fund at time t;
Equity index dividend yield at time t;
Average return on fund over all t;
Actuarial return on the assets during [t, t + 1);
Return on market value of assets during [t, t + 1);
Return on equity index during [t, t + 1);
Interest rate assumed by actuary; and
1/(1 + 0.

Benefit at Retirement

We assume that a lump sum benefit, equal to some fraction of career average salary for each year of pensionable service, is paid on retirement. The lump sum retirement benefit accrues in the following
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way:
B(x + I, t + 1) = (1 + a(t)B(x, t) + mobts(x, t).

(1)

Equation (1) defines the principle on which our proposed plan is
based. It is a career average salary plan with a fixed target rate of
accrual, but the parameters a(t) and b t can be used to vary both the
benefits accrued from past senice and the future rate of accrual in a
manner appropriate to the financial position of the plan at time t. The
plan can be described as a variable defined benefit plan.
Under ideal conditions a(t) is always equal to zero and b t is always
equal to one; equation (1) then simplifies to:
B(x + I, t + 1) = B(x, t) + mos(x, t),

which represents a pure defined benefit plan in which all members receive the same fraction of career average salary for each year of pensionable service. In practice, both a(t) and b t would need to be varied
from time to time to accommodate the variable investment experience
of the plan.
In our model plan each member has the same fixed pensionable
salary, so we can write:
s(x, t) = so.
(2)
We now define:
Bo
n(x, t)

40moso

(3)

B(x, t)/(moso).

(4)

Bo is the target benefit of a member retiring with 40 years service,
and n(x, t) is the effective pensionable service of the member age x at
time t. It follows from equations (1) to (4) that:
n(x + I, t + 1)
B(x,t)

(1 + a(t)n(x,t) + b t

(5)

Bo
40 n(x, t).

(6)

Equations (5) and (6) will be used to project the liabilities of our plan.

2.3

Benefit on Withdrawal

Members who leave service before retirement would receive a deferred lump sum, payable at age 65, based on the accrued benefit at
the time employment ends. Although such individuals would not accrue benefits after leaving, it may be reasonable for them to continue
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to share in any future distributions of surplus before they retire. Thus,
equations (5) and (6), Vl1th b t set to zero, would continue to apply for
deferred pensioners.
As this withdrawal benefit is revalued in line with wage inflation
between the date of leaving and retirement, it is no different from the
benefit that would have accrued for the same period of service had the
member stayed in the plan until age 65. As we have assumed that all
those who leave early are replaced by new entrants of the same age
and salary, it follows that withdrawals before retirement have no effect
on the plan. The total benefits paid to those who leave early and their
replacements would be the same as those received by a single member
who stays in the plan until retirement.

2.4

Discontinuance Benefits

If the plan is wound up, there would be no obligation for the employer to cover any shortfall in the assets relative to the accrued liabilities, and it is unlikely that buying out liabilities linked to future wage
inflation would be an option. The logical course of action is to pay each
member an immediate transfer value, dividing the assets of the fund in
proportion to the value of each member's accrued benefits. Hence, the
amount of each transfer value would be given by:
Transfer Value

=

Solvency Ratio x B(x, t)V 65 - X

(7)

where v is the annual discount factor based on the assumed valuation
interest rate, and the solvency ratio is the market value of the assets
divided by the total value of the accrued benefits.
Although the question of solvency cover is not a problem for the
employer, it is of considerable importance to members, who run the
risk of having their benefits scaled back if the plan is wound up.

2.5

Investment Strategy

In Pension Fund Indicators '96, the U.K.-based fund manager PDFM4
quotes a figure of 77 percent of total U.K. pension fund assets being
invested in equities at the end of 1995. This figure is an average-one
would expect the equity content of any particular fund to depend of
the mean term of its liabilities and the proportion of its liabilities that
are real rather than nominal. Thus, as a general rule, the smaller the
4philips & Drew Fund Management Limited (PDFM), 10 Broadgate, Liverpool Street,
London EC2M 2RH, United Kingdom.
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number of pensioners in a pension plan, the greater the asset allocation
to equities.
Given that there are no pensioner liabilities in our proposed plan
and all the deferred pensioner liabilities are indexed in line with wages,
we assume the fund is 100 percent invested in U.K. equities. It can be
argued that part of the fund should be invested in government stocks
to reduce volatility in returns. Such a reduction in volatility could be
at the expense of lower average returns and, therefore, lower average
benefits.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether a defined contribution plan can reduce the variability in the benefit payout without
reducing either the average benefit payout or volatility in investment
returns.

3 Formulae for Simulations
3.1

Actuarial Valuation

There is no question that the model plan we have described would
require periodic actuarial valuations, as does any defined benefit plan.
The purpose of such valuations would be to:
• Determine the ratio of the assets of the plan to both the value
of the accrued benefits and to the standard fund of our chosen
funding method; and
• Recommend, if judged appropriate, a distribution of surplus or a
change in the rate of benefit accrual.
Two interesting questions not considered are whether the solvency of
the plan should require legal certification and whether the trustees
should have the right to refuse the actuary's advice. We assume here
that the plan is run in accordance v.ith the actuary's recommendations.

3.2

Standard FundS

Should the standard fund for our integrated plan simply be the value
of the accrued benefits? As the accrued benefits are indexed in line with
earnings, such a standard fund would be consistent with the projected
SThe term standard fund is the U.K. terminology for the target level of assets for any
particular funding method.
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unit credit method, a commonly used funding method for large defined
benefit plans.
The projected unit credit method is not prudent for our plan, however, because it requires an increasing rate of contribution for an aging membership. Because our plan is a defined contribution plan, a
projected unit credit standard fund would have insufficient assets to
meet the projected benefits of the existing members should the plan
be closed to new entrants.
The standard fund of the entry age normal method is appropriate
for our plan because:
• It would have sufficient assets to meet the projected benefits if

the plan were closed to new entrants; and
• No strain arises if new entrants above the selected entry age are
matched by withdrawing members of the same age and salary.
The second characteristic arises because a withdrawing member produces a release of reserve under the entry age normal method that
matches the strain created by a new entrant of the same age and salary.
As we have assumed that new entrants and withdrawals are matched
in this way, they can safely be ignored in our simulations. In practice
we may have a growing plan in which there are excess new entrants
entering at ages above the assumed entry age (age 25 for our plan).
This problem could be resolved by requiring such individuals to serve
a nonpensionable waiting period, during which time the employer contributions paid on their behalf would offset the strain on the fund.

3.3

Derivation of Formulae

We assume that all benefit payments from and contributions to the
plan are made at annual intervals coinciding with the date of retirement
of the oldest member. The target benefit, Bo, is set by the actuary:
Bo

=

5401 at rate i.

(8)

The benefit outgo in any year is the lump sum paid to the retiring member, hence:
Bo
B(t) = B(65, t) = 40 n(65, t).
The accrued liabilities and standard fund are given by:
64

AL(t)

=

2:

B

_

~n(x, t)v 6 :>-x
40
X=25

(9)

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.2, 1995

278
64

SF(t)

=

L (:~[n(X,t)+65-X]V65-X-a65_XI)'

(10)

x=25

The market value of the fund is given by the recurrence formula:
F(t + 1) = (F(t) + 40)(1 + jd - B(t + 1).

3.4

(ll)

Solvency and Funding Ratios

The solvency ratio is a measure of the capacity of the pension plan's
assets to cover its accrued liabilities on an immediate wind-up of the
plan, thus:
SR(t) = F(t)/AL(t).

Clearly, large values of SR(t) are desirable.
The funding ratio, on the' other hand, concerns the extent to which
the standard fund is covered by assets. In actuarial valuations of U.K.
defined benefit plans it is customary to use a discounted cash flow
value for the assets rather than their market value, because this tends
to smooth market fluctuations. This is a highly desirable objective for
our plan, as the actuary would wish to avoid recommending benefit
changes as a result of short-term movements in the equity market.
Accordingly, we define Fa (t) to be the actuarial value of fund at
time t; and do to be the par dividend yield. As the fund is 100 percent
invested in U.K. equities, its actuarial value is:
Fa(t)

D(t)F(t) / do

(12)

FR(t)

Fa (t) / SR(t).

(13)

and

3.5

Money Purchase Plan

We compare the benefit outgo of our plan with that of a money purchase plan subject to the same investment experience. For the money
purchase plan, we define f m (x, t) to be the fund accumulated by member age x at time t and Bm (t) to be the benefit outgo at time t of the
money purchase plan. If follows that:

f m (x + 1, t + 1)
Bm(t)

(l + fm(x, t))(l + jd
fm (65, t).

(14)
(15)
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Deterministic Simulations Using Investment and
Earnings Data

In this section we simulate the progress of our plan using U.K. equity
returns and wage inflation from 1950 to 1994. Equity returns prior to
1963 are taken from the BZW Equity Index6 and thenceforth from the
FT-SE-A All-Share Index. 7 Wage inflation is based on the annual increase
in the most representative index of U.K. average earnings available at
the time, as published by the Government Statistical Service (1993).

4.1

Initial Assumptions

The target benefit offered by the plan depends on the assumption
used by the plan actuary for equity returns net of pay increases. The
average net return on the U.K. equity index, using actuarial values, is
roughly 4 percent per annum from 1950 to 1994.
We assume that:
• The actuary sets net interest at 3 percent per annum; and
• Each member initially has pensionable service n(x, 0)

=

x - 25.

Thus, from equations (8), (9), and (10) we can determine that Bo = 77.7
units, AL(O) = 1048 units, and SF(O) = 1215 units.
The equity index dividend yield at the start of 1950 was 5 percent,
which is roughly equal to the average figure from 1950 to 1994. We
therefore assume the par dividend yield to be 5 percent, in which case
the market value of the assets initially will be the same as the actuarial
value. We also assume the plan starts with a funding ratio of 100 percent, thus: F(O) = 1215 units, FR(O) = 100 percent, and SR(O) = 116
percent.
For comparison with a money purchase plan, we assume that:
• The money purchase plan starts with the same assets as our plan
and follows the same investment strategy;
• Each member's initial fund is equal to the entry age normal reserve
at 3 percent interest.
6The BZW equity index is a representath'e stock price index for ordinary shares
traded in the United Kingdom. This index is compiled by the investment bank BarcJays
de Zoete Wedd (hence BZW).
7The FT-SE-A All-Share index is the most representative U.K. stock price index since
1963. It is published by the London Financial Times and is jointly compiled by the
London Stock Exchange and the Institute of Actuaries.
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Fixed Defined Benefit Scale

We first examine what would happen to the plan if it maintained a
fixed benefit outgo regardless of its investment experience (as for a true
defined benefit plan), i.e., a(t) = 0 and b t = 1 for t ~ O. We examine
three different scenarios:
• Case A: jt

=

et and AVRF= i + 0.01;

• Case B: jt = et - 0.01 and A VRF = i; and
• Case C: jt

=

et - 0.02 and AvRF = i - 0.01.

The simulated solvency and funding ratios of the plan are shown in
Figure 1. Part (a) of Figure 1 shows the effect of the average investment
return exceeding the actuary's initial assumption by approximately 1
percent per annum over the 45 year period. The funding surplus remains within reasonable bounds until the early 1980s, at which point it
rises rapidly (from 32 percent of the standard fund in 1982 to 174 percent of the standard fund in 1995). The solvency ratio, derived from the
market value of the assets, is more volatile (falling to 49 percent after
the stock market crash of 1974-1975). The favorable investment experience of the 1980s and 1990s results in the solvency cover exceeding
400 percent in 1994.
Part (b) of Figure 1 shows how the plan behaves when the investment
experience is roughly consistent with the initial 3 percent assumption;
thus, the funding surplus after 45 years is only 22 percent of the standard fund. The solvency ratio is below 100 percent over the eight year
period from 1975 to 1983, but ends at 176 percent.
Part (c) of Figure 1 shows the effect of investment returns averaging
only 2 percent per annum, 1 percent below the actuary's assumption.
The funding and solvency ratios stay within reasonable bounds until the
early 1970s, when the plan goes heavily into deficit and never recovers.
It is only the favorable investment experience of the 1980s and 1990s
that prevents the fund from running out of assets altogether.
These simulations show that a defined contribution plan cannot indefinitely operate with a fixed defined benefit scale unless the actuary
can predict average investment returns with considerable accuracy. The
past experience has shown us a difference of 1 percent per annum between assumed and actual investment returns results in an untenable
position within 40 years. As no actuary can be confident of predicting
the average return to the required degree of accuracy, a variable benefit
scale responding to changes in the funding and solvency positions is
necessary.
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Figure 1
Fixed Defined Benefits: Solvency and Funding Ratios
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Variable Defined Benefit Scale

Our variable defined benefit scale involves assigning values to aCt)
other than zero and values to b t other than one. Davies (1991) comments that a function of surplus in defined benefit plans is to act as
a margin against future unfayorable experience. This criterion is even
more valid for a defined contribution plan attempting to follow a defined benefit scale, as the employer has no obligation to support the
benefit scale with additional contributions. Thus, a fairly large funding surplus is desirable as a margin; perhaps only surpluses above this
funding margin should be distributed. We arbitrarily select a funding
margin of 50 percent of the standard fund, thus:
aCt)

=

FR(t)

max {1.5

-

1, O}.

(16)

A solvency ratio of less than 100 percent is a matter for serious concern, particularly as the required fund for solvency purposes would be
significantly lower than the standard fund. It seems likely that most of
the members would agree to a temporary suspension of benefit accrual
in order to restore the plan to financial health. Thus, the suggested
formula for b t is:
bt =

I if SR(t) ~ 100%
{ 0 if SR(t) < 100%.

(17)

The progress of the plan is simulated for the three investment scenarios. Figure 2 shows the values of aCt) and b t from 1950 to 1994;
Figure 3 shows the solvency and funding ratios; and Figure 4 compares
the benefit outgo of the variable defined benefit plan with that of a
money purchase plan subject to the same funding and investment experience.
As expected, the favorable investment scenario, Case A, results in
the largest and most frequent distributions of surplus (when aCt) > 0),
while benefit accrual is suspended only during the crash of 1974-1975
(when b t = 0). Under the unfavorable investment scenario, Case C,
there is no distribution of surplus (a(t) is always zero), and benefit
accrual is suspended for 13 consecutive years from 1972 to 1984.
Figure 3 shows that in all three scenarios the solvency and funding
ratios follow a remarkably similar pattern. In each case a healthy, but
reasonable, funding surplus emerges after 45 years, and the solvency
ratio ends at approximately 200 percent.
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Figure 2
Variable Defined Benefits: a(t) and b t
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Figure 3
Variable Defined Benefits: Solvency and Funding Ratios
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Figure 4
Comparison of Benefit Outflows
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Figure 4 is the most important one for judging whether the variable
defined benefit plan has any advantages over a money purchase plan.
Figure 4 shows that our proposed plan provides more stable benefits
over time. In each case the variable defined benefit outgo is a trend
line through the money purchase outgo, and sharp variations in benefit
payments from year to year are avoided.

5 Stochastic Simulations
The deterministic simulations of the previous section show us how
the variable defined benefit plan behaves when equity returns follow a
similar pattern to those experienced from 1950 to 1994. The benefit
outgo of our plan is more stable from year to year than that of a money
purchase plan.
We have yet to establish whether the projected retirement fund of
an active member of our plan is less variable than in a money purchase
plan. This question can only be answered adequately through simulations using a stochastic model for equity returns net of wage inflation.

5.1

Stochastic Model for Equity Returns

Recall that rt is the actuarial return on the assets:

rt

(1
=

+ idD(t + 1) - D(t)
D(t)

.

(18)

Let us assume that the actuarial returns form a" sequence of independent, identically-distributed, log-normal random variables. Historical
annual data from 1950 to 1994 yield the estimate for the standard de~
viation ofln[1 + rtl as 0.0675.
Next we consider how to model the equity dividend yield time series.
Wilkie (1986) observes that the average dividend yield on U.K. equities
has tended to vary about a long-term average and that yields in adjacent periods exhibit significant positive correlation. This implies that
the U.K. equity market has tended to correct itself when overvalued or
undervalued by historic standards, which has important implications
for the variability in funds accumulated over long periods.
Wilkie uses a first order autoregressive formula for the logarithm
of the equity dividend yield and assumes that past price inflation had
a direct effect on yields. Because we require a model that operates in
real values, we ignore the latter feature of Wilkie's model and use the
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following formula:
In[D(t)] = (1 - k)J.1d + kln[D(t)] + (J"dNt.Jl - k 2

(19)

where Nt is the standard normal random variable with mean zero and
unit variance, and k, J.1d, and (J"d are parametric constants. The following
estimates for the parameters are obtained from historic data from 1950
to 1994: k = 0.5, J.1d = -3.0, and (J"d = 0.24.

5.2

Initial Assumptions

One thousand independent simulations are performed for both the
variable defined benefit plan and the money purchase plan, so that
values for the projected retirement fund of members at different initial
ages are obtained for both types of plan.
The initial assumptions are as above: Bo is based on a net interest
assumption of 3 percent; FR(O) = 100%; n(x,O) = x - 25; a(t) and b t
are determined as in equations (16) and (17); and j(x, 0) = entry age
normal reserve at 3 percent net interest. For the stochastic investment
model, we assume additionally that D(O) = 5 percent and the mean of
In[1 + rtJ is In(l.03).

5.3

Dependence of Results on Initial Conditions

A problem with simulations for the variable defined benefit plan
is that the expected fund at retirement (and also, to some degree, its
variability) depends on the initial funding and solvency ratios.
We start with a funding ratio of 100 percent. Given the methods
used for determining a(t) and b t , however, the expected funding ratio
at any future time is likely to be greater than 100 percent. In the money
purchase plan there is no similar tendency to build surplus assets. It
follows that for these particular simulations the mean benefit obtained
at retirement will be lower for the variable defined benefit plan than
for the money purchase plan. This will not be true in general, however,
because for future new entrants to the variable defined benefit plan the
funding ratio is as likely to rise as to fall over their period of service.
Also, in the variable defined benefit plan it seems likely that the
variability of the benefit paid at retirement will depend on the size of
the initial fund. Perhaps this variability would be greatest if the initial
funding position of the plan were either very strong or very weak, as
either a(t) or b t then would be more likely to deviate from its usual
value.
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In spite of the problems outlined above, we should still obtain some
useful information from these simulations, particularly in relation to
how the variability in the projected retirement benefit reduces as the
member gets closer to retirement, which we term the narrowing funnel
of doubt.

5.4

Results of Stochastic Simulations

Percentiles for the projected retirement benefit are obtained for both
the variable defined benefit and money purchase plans for members initiallyage 25, 45, and 55 and are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.
For each initial age the money purchase plan pays a higher median benefit. This occurs because we chose an initial funding ratio of 100 percent
for the variable defined benefit plan. There is no reason to believe that
in the long term the median benefit paid by the two types of plan would
differ significantly. To compare the variability of the projected benefit
in each type of plan, we tabulate the ratio of the benefit at the 75th
percentile to that at the 25th percentile; see Table 3.
Table 1
Percentiles for Variable Defined Benefit Plan
Initial
Percentile
Age
5th 25th 50th 75th
95th
142.2
25
46.6 60.2 71.8 92.0
58.3 66.0 71.8 77.7
102.2
45
66.0 69.9 73.8 75.7
78.0
55

Percentiles
Initial
5th
Age
43.8
25
45
47.0
47.8
55

Table 2
for Money Purchase Plan
Percentile
25th 50th 75th
95th
62.3 79.8 104.7 151.7
63.7 80.6 101.5 141.7
63.4 76.7
95.6 129.9
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Initial
Age
25
45
55

Table 3
Interquartile Ratio
Money
Variable
Defined Benefit Purchase
1.53
1.68
1.18
1.59
1.51
1.08

Tables 1 and 2 show that the projected benefit at retirement from the
variable defined benefit plan is at all ages less variable than that from
the money purchase plan. The difference in variability is not that great
at age 25, but becomes more significant as the member nears retirement. Thus, the funnel of doubt narrows more quickly in the variable
defined benefit plan. Members of the variable defined benefit plan will
have less need to switch their fund to low risk assets on approaching
retirement, as normally would be recommended in a money purchase
arrangement.
The narrowing funnel of doubt also means that a member of the
variable defined benefit plan will have more advance warning of a substandard benefit at retirement. We can see how this could occur: a
member who had experienced a period of nil accrual or was currently
serving in such a period would have a reduced benefit expectation. The
advantage of such foresight is that it gives the member an incentive to
make additional provision for retirement.

5.5

Effect of a Lower Funding Margin

We have somewhat arbitrarily assumed that our variable defined
benefit plan would operate with a funding margin of 50 percent, so
that only surpluses in excess of this margin would be distributed. In
practice a margin of this size may not be permitted by legislation. We
now examine the consequences of using a lower funding margin to determine whether the variable defined benefit plan can operate as effectively under such a regime.
Using the same stochastic model for equity returns, 1000 simulations are made for the variable defined benefit plan assuming that all
surpluses in excess of a funding ratio of 125 percent are distributed
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immediately. All other initial assumptions are as before. The results of
the simulations are shown in Table 4.
In Table 5 we tabulate the interquartile ratios, comparing the results
with those obtained for the variable defined benefit plan using a 50
percent funding margin. The increase in variability caused by reducing
the funding margin to 25 percent is not particularly large. The possible
effect on the results of using an initial funding ratio of 100 percent,
however, should be borne in mind.
Table 4
Percentiles for a 25 Percent Funding Margin
Percentile
Initial
Age
5th 25th 50th 75th
95th
25
46.6 60.5 73.7 93.7
130.2
45
56.7 67.2 74.3 87.5
116.2
55
66.0 71.8 74.1 78.2
92.5

Table 5
Interquartile Ratio
Funding Margin
Initial
Age
50 Percent 25 Percent
25
1.53
1.55
45
1.30
1.18
1.08
1.09
55

6
6.1

Ruin Scenarios
Effect of Poor Investment Experience

Thus far we have shown that our plan could cope with investment
returns 1 percent lower than assumed by the actuary. Part (c) of Figure
3 shows that the plan ends with a comfortable funding surplus after 45
years, at the price of having to suspend accrual of benefits from 1972
to 1984. (See Part (c) of Figure 2.)
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We now turn our attention to more extreme situations, in which
even the suspension of accrual is not sufficient to restore the plan to
solvency. Our plan cannot, by definition, be insolvent following a windup because the benefits payable in such an event are shares of the remaining fund. It is theoretically possible, however, that the plan could
exhaust its assets while still in operation, resulting in insufficient cash
flow to pay the benefits promised to retiring members. There are two
factors that might lead to such a situation:
• Extremely and persistently poor investment returns;
• Moderately poor investment returns combined with a declining
number of active members.
A declining number of active members would lead to declining contribution income from the employer, making it more difficult to restore
the plan to a satisfactory position by suspending the accrual of benefits.

6.2

Stationary Active Member Population

Assume that, as in previous simulations, our plan has a stationary
population of active members and that Eo is based on a net interest
assumption of 3 percent; FR(O) = 100%; n(x, 0) = x - 25; and a(t) and
b t are determined as in equations (16) and (17).
We simulate the progress of the plan for the following investment
scenarios:
l. jt "" et - 0.04; and

2. jt

=

et - 0.10.

Scenario (1) implies an average return net of wage inflation of 0 percent
per annum, whereas scenario (2) implies an average net return of -6
percent per annum. Figure 5 shows the results of these simulations.
Part (a) of Figure 5 shows that in both scenarios the assets of the
plan reach a low point after the stock market crash of 1974-1975. In
scenario 2 the assets fall close to zero in 1975, but the plan recovers in
the following years.
Part (b) of Figure 5 shows that the benefit outgo falls in both scenarios. In scenario 2 the poor investment experience results in the continuous suspension of accrual from 1951 to 1985; thus, the benefit outgo
falls more steeply compared with scenario l. An important threshold is

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.2, 1995

292

Figure 5
Effect of Low Investment Returns:
Stationary Active Member Population
Part (a): market value of assets
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attained when the benefit outgo falls below 40 units, the annual contribution income from the employer. At this point the plan is assured of
having sufficient cash flow to pay future benefits. Thus, provided that
the plan has survived to this threshold, there is no longer an immediate
risk of ruin. Significantly, in scenario 2 the benefit outgo falls below 40
units shortly before the stock market crash of 1974-1975.
Part (c) of Figure 5 shows that in both scenarios the solvency ratio
falls to a low point after the 1974-1975 crash and recovers strongly
over the following decade. In scenario 2 there is a brief period in the
early 1980s when the solvency ratio explodes: reaching a maximum
value of 910 percent at the start of 1985. This occurs because the
accrued liabilities of the plan have fallen to a low figure as a result of
the suspension of accrual of benefits for over 30 years. The solvency
ratio of 910 percent is accompanied by a funding ratio of only 127
percent, illustrating the suitability of the entry age normal method for
plans with small accrued liabilities.
These simulations show that the risk of ruin from poor investment
experience is not much of a problem, provided that the number of active members (and therefore the contribution income) does not decline.
Even if investment returns average 6 percent per annum below wage inflation (a pessimistic scenario) and returns are as variable as those over
the past 45 years (including the unusually severe crash of 1974-1975)
our plan would have avoided ruin.
Ruin probabilities are estimated from simulations obtained using
the stochastic model for equity returns described above. One hundred
simulations are made for various different combinations of the mean of
the log-normal distribution for rt and the initial solvency ratio. For the
plan to avoid ruin, we require that F (t) > 0 for all t > O. The number
of occasions on which the plan fails to avoid ruin over each run of 100
simulations is shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Ruin Frequency
Stationary Active Member Population
Average Return on'Fund (A VRF)

SR(O)
1.00
0.75
0.50

0%
0
0
1

-1%
0
0
7

-2%
1
2
28

-3%
1
2
41

-4%
1
3
56

-5%
1
14
83

-6%
17
31
89

-7%
42
59
99

-8%
71
73
100
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As before, ruin probabilities are estimated from simulations obtained using the stochastic model for equity returns described earlier,
each run consisting of 100 simulations. The results are displayed in
Table 7.
Table 7
Ruin Frequency
Declining Active Member Population
Average Return on Fund
SR(O)
0% 1% 2% 3% 4%
1.50
5
0
73 34 20
1.00
90 72 45 21
6
0.50
98 89 67 44 30

The frequencies obtained again appear broadly consistent with the
results of the deterministic simulations. Even when the initial solvency
ratio is 100 percent and the average net investment return is 3 percent
per annum (in line with the actuary's assumption), the estimated probability of ruin is as high as 0.21. Furthermore, a high initial solvency
ratio of 150 percent does not seem to offer much additional protection; the estimated probability of ruin is still as high as 0.20 when the
average investment return is only 1 percent below that assumed by the
actuary.

6.4

Avoiding Ruin

When we have a stationary population of active members, investment returns have to be poor for our plan to run out of money. Unless
the average return falls below the actuary's assumption by around 9
percent per annum, the suspension of accrual appears to be a strong
enough remedy to restore the plan to solvency. Once the benefit outgo
of the plan falls below the contribution income, the possibility of ruin
disappears.
The main problem with the above approach is dissatisfaction among
active members if it appears that the accrual of benefits has been suspended for an indefinite period. It is essential that our proposed plan
requires no member contributions, in order to reduce the likelihood
that a large proportion of the active members would leave the plan if
beaefit accrual were suspended.
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Another option would be to seek the consent of the members for
their accrued benefits to be scaled back in proportion to the solvency
deficit and for accrual to continue at a somewhat lower rate than before.
In such a situation there would be a clear conflict of interest between
members with different amounts of past service; those with long past
service would have most to lose from the accrued benefits being uniformly scaled back, whereas younger members potentially would have
most to gain by the restoration of benefit accrual. The actuary would
play an important role here in suggesting a suitable compromise; the
solvency deficit could be eliminated partly by a cut in the accrued benefits and partly by fixing the rate of benefit accrual at a low level for a
temporary period.
When the active member population of the plan is declining, the risk
of ruin is more serious. In this situation the contribution income of the
plan is falling in relation to the accrued liabilities, so the suspension of
accrual is less effective in restoring the plan to solvency.
Allowing the plan to run out of money is unacceptable, as the remaining active members would be left with no benefits at all at the
expense of those who had been lucky enough to retire (or take transfer
values) earlier. The plan would have to be wound-up, or converted to
a pure money purchase arrangement, before the risk of ruin became
too great. Ideally, this would be done when the solvency ratio was still
above 100 percent.

7 Summary and Conclusions
7.1

Summary of Main Findings

The purpose of this paper is to examine the feasibility of running
a defined contribution plan with a defined benefit scale that could be
varied to accommodate unpredictable and volatile investment returns.
The progress of a simple model plan, paying a benefit linked to career average revalued salary, has been simulated. These simulations
include both deterministic projections based on U.K. investment and
earnings data taken from 1950 to 1994 and projections obtained using
a stochastic model for equity returns. It has been shown that:
• In order to maintain a fixed defined benefit scale over the period
the actuary would have had to predict the average investment return net of wage inflation to an unrealistic degree of accuracy;
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• A plan in which the benefit scale is varied when the size of the
fund falls outside a central corridor can accommodate differences
between actual and assumed investment returns and can maintain
reasonable funding and solvency ratios for returns as variable as
those experienced over the period;
• The benefit payout of this variable defined benefit plan is more
stable over time than that of a money purchase plan subject to
the same volatile investment returns;
• The uncertainty in the projected benefit payout of the variable
defined benefit plan is less than in a money purchase plan and
reduces more quickly as a member approaches retirement;
• Provided that the number of acth'e members is not declining, the
risk of ruin due to poor investment experience is small for the
variable defined benefit plan; and
• If the number of active members is declining, the risk of ruin

becomes increasingly significant for the variable defined benefit
plan, and the plan would need to be wound-up or converted to a
money purchase arrangement.

7.2

Comments on Plan Design

Although the proposed integrated plan pays a benefit linked to career average revalued salary, the same results would have been obtained
for a final salary plan because we assume that each member's salary is
fixed in units linked to general wage inflation. In the real world a career average scale would have concrete advantages because the accrued
liabilities would be less volatile when actual salary increases deviated
from wage inflation. It is also arguable that a career average scale is
better for members, as their benefits are affected less by variations in
pay close to retirement.
The proposed plan requires no member contributions, which seems
to be an absolute necessity if the accrual of benefits is to be suspended
(or severely curtailed) when the solvency ratio falls below a critical
value. Mason (1993) outlines a simple method for converting a contributory plan to a noncontributory plan at no cost to the employer.
There are no pensioner liabilities, because we have assumed a lump
sum benefit is provided at retirement. In practice the lump sum would
be used to buy an immediate annuity from an insurance company.
There are two good reasons why the plan should avoid retaining pensioner liabilities, viz.:
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• Retaining such liabilities would reduce the ratio of the contribution income to the accrued liabilities, making it more difficult to
eliminate a solvency deficit by suspending the accrual of benefit
and thus increasing the risk of ruin; and
• Pensioners would seek representation on a trustee board, and
their interests might conflict with those of the active members.
The benefit on withdrawal from service is revalued in line with wage
inflation. This ensures that the expected benefit at retirement is proportional to the length of pensionable service, irrespective of when the
member leaves the plan. Final salary plans give a lower benefit to those
who leave early, because the rate of revaluation of deferred pensions
is normally below wage inflation. A money purchase plan paying the
same rate of contribution for all members favors younger entrants because their funds accumulate over longer periods compared with older
entrants. It is reasonable to assume that a rational group of employees
would prefer the equitable approach meted by a career average plan.

7.3

Rules for Adjusting the Benefits

The simple rules used for adjusting the benefit payout could be refined to permit greater flexibility. For example, we have assumed that
the whole of any surplus in excess of a 50 percent funding margin would
be distributed immediately. Members retiring just before the funding
ratio went above 150 percent might feel aggrieved. The actuary instead
could recommend a sliding scale for surplus distributions. Similarly, if
the solvency position of the plan were threatened, step-by-step reductions in the rate of accrual may be preferable to the complete suspension of accrual. Refinements of this kind could reduce the variability
in the benefit payout of the plan.
Explicit rules should exist for adjusting the benefit scale, rather
than allowing a purely discretionary approach (as in a with-profit fund).
Members are unlikely to enjoy having their benefits being determined
by what they may perceive as the ,,,,him of the plan actuary. If the actuary felt that any change in the rules were required, this could be put to
the trustees.

7.4

Role of the Plan Actuary

There is little doubt that the plan actuary would have a vital role,
possibly a more important role than in a traditional defined benefit
plan. The members would depend on the advice of the actuary to:
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• Agree on a suitable target benefit for their plan;
• Decide on equitable methods for distributing surplus while retaining an adequate margin against possible unfavorable future
experience;
• Decide on equitable methods for keeping the plan solvent should
investment returns be poorer than expected;
• Take appropriate action if the risk of ruin had become unacceptable as a result of a decline in the number of active members.
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Expected Loss Development in Workers'
Compensation Pricing: A Shift in Credibility
Christopher J. Poteet*

Abstract t
This paper shows that expected loss development is equivalent to adjusting
the full credibility standard and applying credibility by policy period. Expected
loss development should not be used in workers' compensation ratemaking.
The credibility is correct before being adjusted.
Key words and phrases: formula pure premium, ultimate loss development

1 Introduction
Concerns with the current loss development method used in workers' compensation class rate making have been raised by Lamb (1993). If
a class has zero losses at a first report, using a first to ultimate loss development factor produces zero ultimate losses as well. One possible
solution is to use expected loss development. To simplify the illustration, assume that all losses are at the same benefit level, etc. The
other factors easily can be taken into account later. Also for Simplicity
assume that there is only one policy period used and national pure premiums are not used. The following arguments then will be extended to
include more policy periods and the use of national pure premiums.

*Christopher]. Poteet is an actuarial associate at the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. He received a B.S. and an M.Ed. in mathematics from the Pennsylvania State University.
Mr. Poteet's address is: National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc., 750 Park
of Commerce Drive, Boca Raton FL 33487, USA.
tThis paper is based on the author's earlier paper entitled: "Expected Loss Development: A Shift in Credibility" that appeared in the Casualty Actuarial Society Forum, Fall
1995. The author thanks the anonymous referees and the editor for their comments
and suggestions that led to the development of the current paper.
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Workers' compensation classification ratemaking relies on several
estimates of class pure premiums. One estimate is based on the latest available data for the class and state. This is called the indicated
pure premium. Another estimate is the pure premium underlying current rates brought to the level of the indicated pure premiums. This
estimate is called the present on rate level pure premium. A third estimate is a national pure premium which includes data from other states
adjusted to reflect conditions in the reviewed state. These estimates
are combined using credibility weights l to produce the formula pure
premium. The formula pure premium is defined as follows:
J:'
I Pu P
.
_ Formula Pure Premium Losses
rormu a re remlUm Payroll/IOO
.

(1)

The objective of this paper is to show that using expected loss development will yield the same formula pure premium as obtained by
adjusting the credibilities.

2
2.1

Determining Formula Pure Premium
One Year Losses

In order to determine the formula pure premium, we must determine the losses. Using expected loss development, initially the expected loss E (the present on-rate level pure premium multiplied by
the payroll in hundreds) is the estimate of ultimate losses that is used
to calculate the indicated pure premium. At a first report the actual
losses A that have emerged can replace the losses that were expected
to have emerged, namely (l/D) x E, where D is the first to ultimate
loss development factor. If the development factor is less that one, the
estimate of ultimate losses using expected loss development may be
negative. Ultimate losses, however, cannot actually be negative. This
points out a weakness in the expected loss development methodology.
Credibility weighting produces the losses used in the formula pure
premium. Let L denote the losses and Z and (1 - Z) denote the credibility weights used in the formula pure premium. It follows that:
Expected Loss Development:
L

=

Z (A + (1 -

~)E)

+ (1 - Z)E

1 Credibility weights are the relative credence (trustworthiness) assigned to each estimate. These weights are non-negative and sum to one.
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Z

Z

(D)XAxD+(I- D)XE.

(2)

Current Method:
L = Z

x A x D + (1

- Z)

x E.

(3)

Equations (2) and (3) are equivalent where Z I D in equation (2) is substituted for Z in equation (3). (Note that Z does not change.) Using
Z I D instead of Z is equivalent to changing the full credibility standard
that already limits fluctuations of formula pure premiums to a deSired
amount. The expected loss development method relies less on actual
losses and more on expected losses than the current method. The expected loss development method implicitly lowers credibility by liD,
when D > 1. Expected loss development is a shift in credibility, giving
less weight to actual losses and more weight to expected losses.
The equation that shows that expected loss development is equivalent to changing the full credibility standard can be expanded to include more policy periods and national pure premiums. The relationship holds if the credibility of indicated data is calculated by policy
period and the national credibility is allowed to remain unchanged as
one switches from one method to the other.

2.2

A General Formula

It can easily be proved that the serious (or nonserious or medical)
formula pure premium calculated using expected loss development is
equal to the serious (or nonserious or medical) formula pure premium
calculated using credibility by policy period, where the credibility one
normally would use is divided by the policy period's development to
ultimate factor and multiplied by a factor reflecting the contribution
of the policy period's exposure to the total. These individual credibilities are used as weights for the indicated pure premiums calculated
separately for each individual policy period. Let

Ei
Pi

Number of reports of losses;
Actual i-th report of losses, i = 1, ... , m;
i-th to ultimate loss development factor, i = I, ... , m;
Ultimate expected losses for i-th report, i = 1, ... , m;
i-th report payroll in hundreds, i = 1, ... , m;

P

IPi;

m
Ai
Di

m

i=l
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State-indicated credibility weight;
National credibility weight;
National pure premium;
Present on rate level pure premium; and
Formula pure premium.

Z
Zn
p(n)
pte)
p(f)

In practice, we define Ei as follows:
Ei = pte)

X

Pi

for i

=

1, ... , m.

For the expected loss development method,
p(f) =

i i~

(Ai + (1 -

p(f)

(4)

is defined to be

~j )Ei) + ZnP(n) + (1 -

Z - Zn)p(e).

(5)

After some elementary algebra and rearranging terms, we have
p(f) =

f

(ZPi )(AiDi) + ZnP(n) +
i=l DiP
Pi

(1 - Zn - f (ZPi») p(e).

(6)

i=l DiP

On the other hand, for the current method,
m

p(f) =

~Z

(Atf!i) + ZnP(n) + (1 - Zn - Z)p(e).

(7)

t=l

3 An Example
The following example is a specific illustration of the equivalence
relationship. The example uses the data from Lamb (1993, Exhibit 1)
and the development factors listed on page 321 of Lamb's paper. The
state credibilities in the paper are calculated using a square root rule
instead of NCCI's old two thirds rule-the serious state credibility of
0.67 is equal to 0.59 to the three fourths power [0.67 = (0.59 3/ 2 )1/2].
Suppose we are given the follmving information m = 3, Z = 0.67,
= 0.16, p(n) = 1.287, and pte) = 1.203 and the data in Table 1. Using
equations (4) and (5) yields the formula pure premium p(f) = 1.221.
Alternatively, we can use Table 2 and equation (6) to derive the same
result, Le., p(f) = 1.221.
Our example focuses on the calculation of the serious formula pure
premium. More recent years have higher development factors, so credibility is lowered more for them. Each year's credibility also is multiplied
by a weight equal to the year's proportion of exposure to the total of
all years. More recent years would tend to have higher exposures due
to wage inflation, all else constant.
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Table 1
Data
i

AiDi

Di

Pi

1

1,731,862
145,463
393,906

3.773
1.993
1.417

435,476.49
497,284.62
426,167.48

2

3

Table 2
The Alternative Approach
i
(ZPi)J (DiP)
AiDi/ Pi
1
0.057
3.977
0.293
2
0.123
0.148
0.924
3

4

Conclusions

Expected loss development can be thought of as a shift in credibility
from the indicated pure premiums to the present on-rate-level pure premium. (See Table 3.) Expected loss development relies heavily on the
present on-rate-level pure premium, whereas the new NCCI full credibility standard and partial credibility formula give equal weight to the
present on-rate-level pure premium and the national pure premium.
NCCI now uses higher full credibility standards and a 0.4 power
partial credibility formula to recognize the need for stability. The credibility given to the indicated data using the new NCCI standard and
formula is about the same as the credibility for expected loss development, therefore limiting fluctuations by about the same amount as
expected loss development. An advantage to the expected loss development scheme is the consideration of different credibilities by policy
period.
Expected loss development should not be used in workers' compensation class rate making. Expected loss development is equivalent to
adjusting credibility. An extensive study was performed by NCCI to
develop new full credibility standards and a partial credibility formula
that provides a desirable balance between stability and responsiveness.
Adjusting these credibilities dovmward would restrict the fluctuations
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Table 3
Credibilities
Indicated
Serious Pure Premium
Current Loss Development
0.67
Expected Loss Development
0.33
New NCCI Standard & Formula
0.38
Notes: PORL = Present on Rate Level

National
0.16
0.16
0.31

PORL
0.17
0.51
0.31

in formula pure premiums and make rate changes less responsive. This
is especially undesirable in states that have undergone major workers'
compensation benefit reforms in recent years. One might argue that
more recent years should receive less credibility than older years because more recent data are less mature. On the other hand, responsiveness to a changing workers' compensation environment would be
sacrificed.
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